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Quantifying the Impact of Social Mobilisation in Rural Bangladesh:
Donors, Civil Society and ‘The Road not Taken’
Naila Kabeer with Ariful Haq Kabir and Tahera Yasmin Huq
Summary
As part of a general trend toward a reduced role for the state, international donors
have increasingly encouraged development NGOs to take up a service delivery
function. In Bangladesh, this has induced NGOs to shift their core activities away
from social mobilisation to a focus on providing microfinance services, although
many organisations also promote education, health and other social services.
NGOs are credited with some of Bangladesh’s remarkable progress on poverty
reduction, human development indicators and the Millennium Development Goals.
However, social inequalities persist, and the quality of governance is extremely low.
This paper reports on the impact of an NGO, Nijera Kori (NK), in rural Bangladesh
on its members’ democratic knowledge, practice and engagement. Unique among
its peers, NK’s work with the landless poor prioritises rights, social mobilisation
and solidarity over more individualistic forms of democratic participation. The
study carried out a survey of randomly selected members of NK, along with a 
randomly selected ‘control group’ from the same socioeconomic background of
the NK membership. Statistical analysis of the data confirms much higher levels of
political awareness and participation among NK members. More surprisingly,
given that NK does not distribute microfinance, NK membership was also 
associated with a number of material impacts, including more diverse household
diets, a higher likelihood of asset ownership and higher levels of economic activity
relative to non-members. Levels of ‘trust’ in local power structures and public 
institutions were significantly lower amongst NK members compared to non-
members, challenging some of the dominant assumptions about the positive 
correlation between social trust and political participation. We propose that NK’s
intensive focus on education, information-sharing and social mobilisation instils a
level of political consciousness in members that qualifies trust in public institutions,
with implications for enhanced democratic accountability and an alternative civil
society approach to improving democratic citizenship.
Keywords: citizenship; working poor; economic rights; civil society.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Objectives of this paper 
Actors and agencies within the development field operate with different theories of
how change happens and their own role in making it happen (Eyben et al. 2007).
This paper is concerned with the particular theory of change that informs the 
activities of Nijera Kori (NK), a non-governmental organisation in rural Bangladesh
that seeks to mobilise poor women and men to claim their rights. It reports on the
findings of a study that was commissioned by NK as part of its own internal 
learning process1 about the extent to which it was achieving the goals that it had
set itself and how it could be more effective in its efforts. 
The paper has relevance to the wider development community for a number of
reasons. The use of a quantitative approach to assess the impact of an 
organisation concerned with social mobilisation will be of interest to those 
concerned with measuring the more intangible aspects of development processes.
In addition, the study has a bearing on the stories of civil society and social
change that have come to dominate the mainstream of the international 
development community. While NK subscribes to a theory of change that is 
somewhat at variance with these theories of change, its achievements resonate
with mainstream concerns with development and democracy. It can be seen
therefore as an alternative road to the same destination. 
The paper is structured along the following lines. The rest of this introductory 
section examines some of the alternative approaches to civil society, its relationship
to the state and its role in social change to be found in the social science literature.
Section 2 provides a brief history of state-society relations in Bangladesh and the
emergence of the development NGO sector as a major force in civil society. This
provides the context in which NK emerged and evolved its own distinctive 
understanding of state society relations and its strategies for social change. It 
concludes with a description of the methodology used to assess the organisation’s
impacts in the field. The findings from the survey are reported in Section 3. They
include impacts relating to poverty reduction and other MDG; impacts relating to
community participation and collective action; impacts relating to policy and 
politics; and finally impacts relating to values, attitudes and perceptions of change.
Chapter 4 summarises the main findings and reflects on their implications for
actual processes of development and democracy in Bangladesh.
1.2 Competing theories of social change: civil society, development 
and democracy
While debates about civil society and its role in processes of development and
democratisation have experienced a major resurgence with the transition from
authoritarian to democratic rule in various parts of the world, the concept of civil 
1 Along with a number of others (see Barkat et al. 2008 and Masud Ali et al. 2008).
society is an old one. It has its inception in theories within early Western political
philosophy concerned with limiting the potential for despotism by an absolutist
state (Elliot 2006). One tradition, associated with the work of Locke, was based on
the vision of a self-directing society, with a limited role for the state while civil 
society served to defend individual freedom. Another tradition, associated with the
work of Montesqueu and de Toquville, saw the curtailment of state despotism to
lie in a constitution defined by law and protected by a counterbalancing force of
independent bodies. For Toqueville, these counterbalancing forces would be 
provided by local associations of citizens ‘acting together in the affairs of daily life’
(cited in Elliot, p5). 
This philosophical literature has given rise to a view of civil society as the sphere
of voluntary associations, distinct from society as a whole as well as from other
spheres of society: from the ‘amoral familism’ of kinship relations which prioritises
narrow and short term interests over the larger good; from the politics of conflict
and the struggle for power which characterises the political sphere; and from the
competition for scarce resources which is the hallmark of market behaviour. Recent
work by Putnam (2000) spelt out more explicitly the benefits of associational life
for democratic values and practices. He suggested that individuals coming together
in voluntary associations helped to create ‘social capital’, those features of societal
relations that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. In 
particular, the patterns of trust that developed within these associations provided
the basis for more generalised trust throughout society, building the basis for civic
engagement, public spiritedness and effective government. While he recognised
that some associations were more productive of these values than others, he 
suggested that it was the density of associational life rather than the character of
different associations that mattered for the development of generalised trust in a
society, providing the basis on which its citizens were able to participate in 
democratic life and hold their governments accountable. 
There have been various criticisms of this conceptualisation of civil society as the
main bulwark against an intrusive and bureaucratic state. Some pointed out that
Putnam’s focus on civic-minded associations, and failure to consider conflicts of
interests within civil society, led to generalisations that took no account of the
‘darker face’ of social capital, for instance, the possibility that associational ties
can be used as effectively by fascist organisations to pursue their goals as they
can by human rights activists to pursue theirs (Putzel 1997). Others suggested
that the capacity to build voluntary associations was unevenly distributed in any
society and favoured those who were less dependent on patron-client relationships,
in other words, the already privileged in the middle and upper classes (Blaney 
and Pasha 1993). Edwards (2000) questioned the emphasis placed on the 
development of trust in communities characterised by marked inequality: ‘trust is
not an unalloyed good’ when it can be easily abused by unscrupulous others (p6).
In such contexts, ‘conflict and struggle may be essential to the advancement of
people on the margins’ (p6). 
Conflict and struggle are precisely at the heart of the radical critique of liberal 
theories of civil society. Drawing on the work of Marx and Gramsci, this critique
argues that civil society cannot be treated as a distinctive sphere of society. It is
governed by, and enmeshed with, the same power relations that are embedded
within the structures of the state and hence represents another sphere in which
IDS WORKING PAPER 333
8
IDS WORKING PAPER 333
9
conflicts of interest between dominant and subordinate groups are played out
(Elliot 2006; Davis and McGregor 2000). But whereas those in power defend their
interests in the political sphere through their direct control of the state and juridical
government, they exercise more indirect forms of power in the sphere of civil 
society through their hegemony in the field of culture and ideology. 
Civil society and states do not operate as counterbalancing forces in this radical
critique but are ‘implicated together in promoting the interests of capital’ (Davis
and McGregor, p 50). At the same time, because the form and content of civil
society in a particular historical period is the outcome of past and ongoing class
struggles and ideological contestations, ‘real’ civil societies are heterogeneous
and internally differentiated containing organisations that are committed to 
upholding the existing social order as well as others that seek to challenge it. 
Within the international donor community, it has been liberal, rather than the 
radical, views of civil society, and the work of Putnam in particular, that has been
most influential. It has lent itself to interpretations that straddle concerns with both
development and democracy (Davis and McGregor 2000). When neoliberal reforms
and the move to privatisation which began in the late 1970s revealed that market
failures and imperfections were widespread in many developing country contexts,
the grassroots operations of NGOs suggested a proximity to those sections of the
population that commercial providers failed to serve. They became identified as
the preferred ‘private’ alternative to government in the provision of pro-poor social
services. 
By the 1990s, other pressures came to bear on donor perspectives on civil society.
On the one hand, with the end of the Cold War and the ‘depreciation in the value
of Third World regimes as strategic assets’ (Sobhan 2000: 78), the undemocratic
character of many governments, their violations of the basic rights of their citizens
and their malfeasance in the use of aid received increasing attention within the
donor community as a major factor in slowing down progress on development
goals. The ‘good governance agenda’ which became popular within the donor
community around this time highlighted the role of civil society in holding 
governments to account, suggesting a ‘virtuous circle’ could be built between
state, economy and civil society which would balance growth, equity and social
stability (Archer 1994; Diamond 1994). This new terminology of civil society
included development NGOs but was expanded to also include human rights
organisations and advocacy groups of various kinds, all of which could act as
bearers of democratic values and builders of trust (Robinson 1993).
At the same time, the end of the Cold War reduced the need to keep developing
countries within the orbit of Western influence and saw the onset of political 
pressure to reduce aid dependence. Within developing countries, this translated
into practical pressures to scale up successful NGO service delivery models in
order to reduce burdensome transaction costs and to move towards full financial
sustainability. These practical pressures were exerted through a range of 
management and auditing techniques that had been imported into the aid 
industry from the private sector (Desai and Imrie 1998). The distribution of donor
funding was increasingly framed in the technical discourse of ‘efficiency, value
added, cost effectiveness and output/performance orientations’. It sought to 
promote a linear narrative of social change through the application of the ‘logical
framework’ structure to the planning, implementation and evaluation of civil 
society activities. Social change, in other words, had to be achieved within the
time limits of the project cycle and entailed the quantifiable and predictable 
translation of inputs into outputs, outcomes and impacts of overarching 
development goals. 
We can therefore distinguish between two distinct theories about the role of civil
society in bringing about social change within donor discourses. The first sees
civil society as a cost-effective provider of services, particularly to poor people and
thereby contributing to a country’s progress on poverty reduction and the
Millennium Development Goals. The second sees civil society as the torchbearer
for democratic values and individual rights and hence critical to the promotion of
‘good governance’ within a country. We will take these narratives as our point of
departure for assessing the impact associated with the work of NK, an organisation
that rejects the model of NGOs as service providers but whose ‘good governance’
agenda departs in critical ways from that of the mainstream donor community.
Although it shares the discourse of human rights, democratic participation and
state accountability with the donor community, its model of change is closer to the
radical tradition associated with Gramsci. 
2 The Bangladesh paradox: social 
progress in the absence of  good 
governance
2.1 State and society in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation in 1971 after nearly a quarter of a
century as the eastern wing of Pakistan in which it occupied virtual colony status.
The constitution adopted by the new nation was committed to upholding 
fundamental human rights, including the right to life and personal liberty, privacy,
equality, freedom of movement, religion, expression, thought and conscience and
property. In addition, the constitution spelt out the fundamental principles of state
policy, charging the state to ensure food, shelter, employment and education for
all its citizens. Although these were stated to be non-justiciable, the constitution
declared them to be fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh, to be applied
in the laws and to guide constitutional and legal interpretation. 
The reality of Bangladesh is markedly different from its constitutional ideals. 
The workings of the government are marked by political partisanship and lack of
transparency and accountability (Dunn et al. 2000). While the army has ruled
Bangladesh off and on since it gained its independence (and for most of its history
as East Pakistan), it is not simply the presence or absence of multi-party 
democracy that is the problem in Bangladesh, but the pervasiveness of ‘bad 
governance’ in all aspects of everyday and political life. This has been traced to
the workings of the key institutions through which resources are allocated and
power is exercised in Bangladesh. 
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The state in Bangladesh has never been equally accessible to all citizens, either
in the days when the country was part of Pakistan or since it gained its 
independence in 1971. The weakness and unpredictability of the institutions of
governance means that there is widespread reliance at every level of society on
patron-client relationships, often rooted in family and kinship networks, allowing
the families that dominate these networks through their privileged access to land, 
capital and education to also capture a disproportionate share of public sector 
distribution. Social inequalities based on gender, religion, and ethnicity further
exacerbate the economic stratification of the social order. Poor and vulnerable
sections of the population are either excluded from patronage networks or 
participate on terms that reduce them to the status of highly dependent clients,
deprived of voice and agency in their own affairs or the affairs of the community. 
The legal system is itself a part of this larger problem of governance. Some laws
discriminate on grounds of gender, religion and ethnic identity, others are simply
not enforced. Justice can be bought and sold and the manipulation of the law has
emerged as a powerful tool to harass and intimidate the weak and vulnerable.
The chances of getting formal justice are random for most citizens, but they are
particularly remote for those without resources, position or social networks. Most
must rely on the informal mechanism of shalish carried out at village level and 
dominated by village elites. 
Extended kinship and patron-client networks have been carried over into urban
life and pervade all sectors of society, public as well as private. The ‘moral logic’
of these relationships requires that the private interests of their members take
precedence over the larger public good. Thus blurring of moral boundaries
between public and private behaviour, the widespread reliance on personal
favours and influential connections undermine the likelihood that public institutions
will operate on the basis of transparent and impersonal criteria and weaken the
basic principles of citizenship and accountability (Wood 2000). 
The precarious status of citizenship rights in Bangladesh has been compounded
by the failure of successive regimes, both military and civilian, to rectify the 
situation. The implementation of neoliberal reforms and the opening up of the
economy to private enterprise and global competition since the 1980s has seen
the emergence of new opportunities for wealth accumulation. However, restoration
of multi-party democracy in 1991 appears merely to have introduced political 
partisanship into the competition for valued resources. It was during civilian rule
that Bangladesh was ranked as ‘most corrupt country’ in the world by Transparency
International for five consecutive years (1997–2001). Persistent instability resulting
from the confrontational zero sum politics of the main parties led to army rule under
a caretaker government in 2007. Electoral politics was restored again in 2009.
Wood uses the metaphor of the prison to convey the idea of Bangladesh society
as a ‘total institution’ which prescribes all aspects of the lives of those who live
within it. Survival within the system dictates that social actors have little choice but
to follow the dysfunctional forms of behaviour generated by these systemic 
institutional forces. He suggests that this has given rise to inequalities that are so
deep-rooted in the ‘psychology of Bengali society’ that they translate into ‘natural’
deference-authority dyads making it impossible for the inmates of this prison to
claim their rights or to reform its institutions through their own efforts. Those who
seek escape must therefore look for assistance to those outside the system: ‘donor
and other external well-wishers have a duty to provide that assistance’ (p 237).
However, the rigidity of structural constraints implied by this metaphor does not
square easily with the rapid progress that Bangladesh has made on the social
front. Since the succession of natural disasters and political crises which 
characterised the 1970s, the country has seen a remarkable decline in fertility
rates as well as in infant, child and maternal mortality. Growth rates have risen,
outstripping the rate of population growth, and poverty has been declining since
the 1990s, gradually but systematically. Rising rates of education have been
accompanied by the elimination of the gender gap at primary level and its steady
reduction at secondary level. The restoration of multi-party democracy in early
1990 and progress on the decentralisation agenda has led to high rates of 
participation at elections. UN estimates suggest that Bangladesh will achieve a
number of the Millennium Development Goals more rapidly than other more 
prosperous countries in the region. 
While these changes on the development front could clearly not have occurred
without government support, it is the ‘unique role’ of Bangladesh’s development
NGOs (World Bank 2006) and their ‘pioneering social entrepreneurship’ in the
design and delivery of pro-poor services (World Bank 2003), which has been 
singled out in recent literature seeking to explain the paradox of the country’s
remarkable socioeconomic progress in the absence of good governance (BRAC
2006). The question that remains is why these organisations have failed to
achieve commensurate improvements in the quality of democracy in the country.
We will return to this question in the concluding section of the paper.
2.2 The NGO sector in Bangladesh 
Development NGOs in Bangladesh have undergone considerable change since
their inception in the aftermath of the country’s struggle for independence. Most
NGOs that were set up during that period subscribed to a radical analysis of
poverty, tracing it to the unequal structures of power, and to the need to mobilise
poor people on a collective basis to bring about lasting processes of change
(BRAC 1983; Ahmed 1982; Devine 2002). Unlike many other developing countries,
these NGOs were largely home-grown, although they drew on funds from northern
NGOs, such as Oxfam, War on Want, Novib, Swallows, CUSO, from private 
foundations, like Ford, and from a few progressive Nordic donors. 
With the onset of a military government in 1976, many began to tone down their
radical stance and take on a more developmental role. Further changes occurred
in the late 1980s. In line with the neoliberal shift in emphasis within the official
donor community away from support for state delivery systems to privatised forms
of service delivery, there was a significant increase in the flow of official donor
assistance into the NGO sector. This trend is evident in Bangladesh. A review of
the country’s 11 largest NGOs2 in 2000 found that the percentage of total foreign
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2 Those which had a membership or client base of at least 150,000 people.
aid that went directly to NGOs had risen from 6 per cent in 1990 to 18 per cent by
1995 and had remained since then around this level (Thornton et al. 2000; see
also Devine 2003). The increased availability of funds led to a proliferation in NGO
numbers: between 1990–91 and 1999–2000, the number of registered national
NGOs had increased from 395 to 1,223. However, much of this increased donor
funding has become increasingly concentrated in an ‘elite group of NGOs’ which
have moved into a league of their own in terms of size, budgets and staffing
(Devine 2003). Of the 1,250 NGOs that received international assistance in
1999–2000, the three largest NGOs (BRAC, Proshika and ASA) received more
than 72 per cent of all donor funds to the NGO sector. 
This pattern of favouring the large NGOs reflects the concerns within the donor
community that we noted earlier and the pressures these generate ‘to scale up
successful development operations, reduce burdensome transaction costs,
decrease NGO reliance on donor money and initiate a process that would secure
financial sustainability’ (Devine 2003: 230). These pressures have also led to an
increased preference for funding NGO provision of economic services, particularly
microfinance, and a move away from social services and, to an even greater
extent, from the social mobilisation of poor people. The study of large NGOs by
Thornton et al. (op cit) found that spending on microcredit rose from 29 per cent of
their combined total experience to 38 per cent during the period studied and from
27 per cent to 34 per cent for economic support services. It declined from 33 per
cent to 22 per cent for social services and from 11 per cent to 6 per cent for social
mobilisation. A recent World Bank study found that over 80 per cent of NGOs 
surveyed were engaged in the delivery of microfinance while around 50 per cent
provided social services (2006). In addition, 93 per cent of NGOs were involved in
awareness raising on at least one issue, usually sanitation, health and nutrition,
and 42 per cent had been involved in advocacy or lobbying the government in the
previous year. 
2.3 Nijera Kori’s vision and strategies: ‘we don’t do credit’ 3
The only exception to this large-scale shift to microcredit was Nijera Kori, the
smallest of the NGOs included in the study by Thornton et al. Its expenditure on
social mobilisation remained unchanged at 100 per cent throughout the period
under study and indeed since its inception in 1980. NK’s goals and strategies
reflect its analysis of power, poverty and social injustice in the context of
Bangladesh. While its documents and reports do not generally cite critical 
philosophical debates about the nature and role of civil society, its analysis
echoes some of the key strands of the radical tradition. It has a strong class 
perspective on poverty as the product of the unequal distribution of the means of
production but it also stresses the power of hegemonic ideologies and the
absence of a ‘culture of rights’ in keeping poor people poor. It believes that the
fragmentation and disunity of poor people is the product of their incorporation into
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3 In a country where the overwhelming majority of NGOs are now engaged in microfinance, NK 
frequently identifies itself with the statement ‘we don’t do credit’.
vertical relationships based on patronage rather than horizontal relations based on
solidarity. This has suppressed their capacity to exercise voice and agency on
their own behalf. It also believes that the denial of even the most basic levels of
education to the vast majority of poor people means that they are largely unaware
of their constitutional rights and legal entitlements. 
Its strategy for overcoming this fragmentation and disunity is explicitly rooted in
the Freirian politics of ‘conscientisation, organisation, mobilisation’. It draws its
membership from the ranks of the landless and near-landless who make up the
majority of the poor population in Bangladesh, who rely on their own physical
labour to earn a living but exercise little control over the terms on which it is
exchanged. They are wage workers, sharecroppers and marginal farmers, artisans,
rickshaw pullers, barbers, blacksmiths, potters and so on (NK Three Year Plan
2000–2003). NK organises its members into separate groups of women and men,
called ‘bhumiheen samity’ or ‘landless societies’ which range in size from 15 to
20. Each group elects its own leadership. These groups are federated into the
Bhumiheen Samity, the Society of the Landless, which has its own independent
structure and elected leadership at different levels of the structure.
All groups are required to save on a weekly basis but decide for themselves how
much they will save. This is intended to reduce their members’ vulnerability in
times of crisis and their dependence on usurious forms of credit. It also acts as a
fund to support various forms of collective action. NK encourages its groups to
save their money in bank accounts, partly to ensure that their money is safe but
also to familiarise them with bank procedures. 
Groups meet weekly to plan their activities and to discuss and analyse issues that
range from their personal lives to broader questions of culture and political 
economy. NK places a great deal of emphasis on this collective discussion and
analysis. As social movement theory has pointed out, the cultural narratives within
which organisations frame their vision of society play a powerful role in explaining
the willingness of subordinate groups to mobilise for social change. NK’s cultural
narratives revolve around its vision for social change, a society based on justice,
equality and rights, and it places the development of critical consciousness on the
part of subordinate groups at the heart of its model of change. Training is one key
method used to bring about this change. While it is strongly influenced by the 
pedagogic approach developed by Paulo Freire, its methods and content have
been ‘indigenised’ over the years to reflect the specificities of the local culture and
context. 
Training provides members with a structural analysis of social inequality and its
roots in the distribution of resources and power in society. It also provides them
with information about their rights and entitlements as well as practical skills for
income-generating purposes. Along with training, NK promotes a variety of cultural
programmes for its membership, using songs, role play, poetry and grassroots
drama to convey its messages about their constitutional rights, their status as
equal citizens before the country’s law and the importance of collective action to
claim their rightful status. 
A simple classificatory system is used to monitor group development over time. A
first level is made up of relatively new groups who are in the process of becoming
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organised, developing basic levels of awareness, building up the group savings
fund, learning to keep accounts and getting into the habit of regular attendance at
their weekly meetings. When groups move beyond their individual concerns and
show a willingness to act on behalf of the poor more generally, irrespective of
whether they are group members or not, they are re-classified as ‘second level’
groups. 
The third level is made up of groups who have begun to manage themselves, 
calling their own meetings and initiating their own collective actions. Members of
these groups are regarded as local level leaders, they participate in national 
rallies, they are more likely to use their savings for the benefit of the community
and they fight to ensure collective access to local resources. NK follows a process
for partial withdrawal as groups progress to secondary and then to higher levels.
However, it remains involved in planning and executing projects which cover 
larger areas as well as in mediation and advocacy at local, regional and national
levels with government administration, the courts and the police. 
As we have already noted, NK has remained consistent in its resistance to a 
service delivery role and its decision to remain focused on mobilising the landless
poor. It is particularly hostile to the microfinance services which are provided by
the vast majority of NGOs in Bangladesh today. It hostility is based on the belief
that the role of service delivery creates new forms of patron-client relationships
between NGOs and their constituencies, diverting the energies of both from the
larger goals of attacking the structural roots of power and democratising the state. 
This position makes NK unique within the ‘unique’ development NGO sector in
Bangladesh. Yet the organisation has remained relatively under-researched. The
overwhelming majority of studies of the NGO sector in Bangladesh have focused on
microfinance organisations, particularly the better-known ones. They have been
largely survey-based, with the emphasis on the more easily measured poverty-
related impacts associated with the delivery of services – although a number have
also looked at less tangible impacts associated with women’s empowerment within
the domestic domain. The findings of these studies have generally been positive,
lending empirical support to claims about the role of the NGO sector in explaining
the country’s considerable progress in meeting the Millennium Development Goals
(see Hashemi et al. 1996; Halder 2003; Khandker 1999; Kabeer 2001).
None of these studies have sought to ask questions about NGO contributions on
the governance front, despite widespread acknowledgement of the poor state of
governance in Bangladesh by donors, civil society and by the public at large. To
what extent are these organisations fulfilling the democratic potential attributed to
civil society? Have they had any impact on the ability of poor people to participate
in the political life of their society and to hold the state accountable? Those studies
that have explored the political impact of NGOs have generally focused on the more
socially oriented organisations. They have been generally positive but they have
also relied on qualitative methods, making it difficult to ascertain the magnitude and
significance of the findings they report (Lewis 2007; Devine 2002; Kabeer 2005). 
The present study thus addresses an important gap. It reports on the findings of a
survey that was purposively designed to measure the tangible and intangible
impacts of an organisation that follows a very different strategy from those that
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have come to dominate the NGO sector in Bangladesh and internationally. It
reports, in other words, on the ‘road not taken’. In doing so, it throws light on the
possibilities for social change that may have been foregone in the shift towards
market-mediated approaches and away from a radical engagement with the 
structures that generate poverty and bad governance. 
2.4 Description of methodology 
The design of the methodology for this study was influenced by a number of 
factors. First and foremost, it was influenced by NK’s need to learn more about its
own performance in relation to the goals it had set itself. We therefore worked
with its staff to design impact indicators that would capture the political knowledge
and awareness of NK group members, their participation in informal decision-
making forums within the community and in the formal policy and political domains. 
Secondly, it was influenced by findings in earlier qualitative studies into NK as well
as into a broader range of development NGOs (Kabeer 2003 and 2005; Kabeer
with Haq Kabir 2009). These had drawn out some of the different processes which
contributed to the identity and practice of citizenship among poor men and women
in Bangladesh. These included the willingness to question forms of injustice that
they had previously taken for granted or felt afraid to protest; the development of
a critical collective consciousness and identity based on shared experiences of
class and gender oppression; knowledge about their rights as citizens and their
entitlement to equal treatment before the law; the leverage provided by collective
action to win gains on behalf of their members, the willingness to take action
against more general instances of injustice; the use of the law to legitimate their
struggles; and the emergence of a grassroots leadership on the basis of their 
reputation for standing up for poor people. 
And thirdly, we wanted to explore the extent to which NK’s social mobilisation
strategies offered an alternative route to poverty reduction and the MDG goals to
the service provision approach which characterises the NGO community in
Bangladesh today. The survey included a number of MDG-type indicators to 
capture this aspect of impact. Our use of a quantitative approach to assess the
impact of an organisation concerned with social mobilisation will make the findings
of the study of relevance to those interested in measuring the more intangible
aspects of development processes. 
The location of the study was also decided in collaboration with NK staff. They
were interested in comparing what they considered to be one of their more 
‘successful’ areas with one that was less successful. Their criterion of success
was the extent to which group members had engaged in collective action for their
rights. We selected the thana of Sagatha to represent the relatively more 
‘successful’ area. NK had been active in it since the mid-eighties and the average
age of its landless groups was 16 years. Daudkhandi was selected to represent
the less successful area. NK had begun active group formation in this area in the
late eighties. The average age of NK groups in this thana was 10 years.
The impact attribution strategy adopted by the study was to compare NK members
with a ‘control’ group of non-members with the same socioeconomic characteristics
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to be drawn from neighbouring villages into which NK planned to expand. 250 NK
group members were selected by the research team from ten villages in each of
the two thanas on the basis of random sampling, stratified by gender, from a full
list of members provided by NK staff. A sample frame for the control group was
developed through a full village census of ten villages neighbouring those in which
NK was not presently active. A random sample of 250 non-members, stratified by
gender, was drawn from all individuals who conformed to the selection criteria for
NK membership. 
It was evident from the outset that a number of factors were going to complicate
our attempt to attribute impact on the basis of a straightforward comparison of NK
and non-NK members. The first set of factors related to locational characteristics.
Sagatha is among the poorest thanas in Bangladesh while Daudkandi, although
not the most prosperous, was relatively much better off. Even within the thanas,
there were likely to be differences in access to infrastructure and services
between NK and non-NK members. This is evident in Table 2.1. The village
dynamism index reported in the bottom row of the table is based on positive
responses to questions about access to infrastructure, services and resources. It
could therefore take a value from 0 to 7 for each household. It tells us that while
patterns varied across these facilities, NK members in both thanas were 
generally more favourably located than non-members. Since these locational 
differences could confound evidence of impact, they had to be factored into the
analysis. 
Table 2.1  Differences in village level characteristics between NK
and non-NK members in the two thanas
% within one Sagatha Daudkandi 
kilometre of: Non-NK NK Sig. Non-NK NK Sig. 
Tarmac road 97 82 .000 76 100 .000
Bus stop 11 40 .000 55 87 .000
Health clinic 96 89 .004 100 99 .124
School 81 71 .000 100 89 .011
Union parishad 14 48 .000 9 30 .000
% with electricity 42 82 .000 62 100 .000
% in village with irrigation 99 100 .249 95 76 .000
Village dynamism 4.4 5.1 .000 5.0 5.8 .000
(mean value)
A second set of potentially confounding factors related to the characteristics of the
respondents. We had sought to use a sampling strategy that would provide a
‘control’ group with socioeconomic characteristics as similar as possible to our NK
sample so that evidence of possible impacts could be attributed to NK activities
rather than to differences in the characteristics of the two groups. Table 2.2 
suggests that our strategy, by and large, succeeded. Differences in age, gender
composition, household headship status, education levels and literacy between
NK members and non-members were all small. 
The NK sample had higher percentages of female household heads, who are 
generally poorer than males in Bangladesh and of Hindus, a religious minority in
Bangladesh. This is likely to reflect a deliberate strategy on the part of the 
organisation to recruit from socially marginalised groups. As far as land ownership
is concerned, the table reports on inherited land ownership which is not likely to
be affected by NK membership. It suggests that over two-thirds in each group had
not inherited any cultivable land at all; 25 per cent of NK members and 16 per
cent had not inherited any homestead land either. Given that the official definition
of landlessness in Bangladesh is the ownership of less than 50 decimals of 
cultivable land and that the average land inherited was around 12–15 decimals, it
is clear that both NK and non-NK members came from extremely poor families. 
What did present a problem for our methodology related to membership of NGOs
other than NK: 21 per cent of NK members and 24 per cent of non-NK members
belonged to another NGO. Microfinance providers, including Grameen, BRAC,
ASA and SKS in that order, featured most frequently among these other NGOs.
Given that these organisations mainly target women for their lending activities, it is
not surprising that it was mainly women who reported membership of these other
organisations. Membership of alternative NGOs clearly complicated our attribution
strategy since some of the impacts we found, or failed to find, may reflect these
alternative forms of membership. 
Table 2.2  Characteristics of sample respondents
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Non-NK NK
Age 40 42 .000
Female 50 50
Household head 53 52
Spouse of hh head 44 38
Female household head 3.8 7.2 .012
Muslim 95 84 .000
Hindu 5 16 .000
Married 96 88
Single – 3
Widowed 3 9
Abandoned – 1
Household size 
No formal education 56 60
Primary education 26 23
Secondary 15 14
Higher 3 3
Can read letter 35 33
Can write letter 31 31
Mean size homestead land inherited (in decimals) 4.41 5.53 .033
Mean size cultivable land inherited (in decimals) 15.5 12.38
% belonging to other NGOs 24 21
IDS WORKING PAPER 333
19
In order to take account of these potentially confounding factors, we will be 
carrying out our analysis in two stages. The first stage provides straightforward
comparisons of impact indicators between NK and non-NK groups in order to get
a general picture of the magnitude of differences. The second stage uses 
regression analysis to control for confounding factors. 
Because of the limited range of values taken by many of our outcome variables,
we have transformed them into dichotomous variables and have used logistic
regression analysis for this stage of the assessment. 
Regression analysis allowed us to control for the individual characteristics of
respondents that could influence the impacts in question. In particular, it allowed
us to control for different categories of NGO membership, distinguishing between
(a) those who were members of NK only (b) those who were members of NK and
another NGO, (c) those who were members of other NGOs only and (d) those
who did not belong to any NGO at all. We used ‘no membership of any NGO’ as
the reference category in the regression analysis so that regression coefficients 
associated with different categories of NGO membership captured the likelihood
of their difference from the ‘no NGO membership’ category. While controlling for
these different categories of NGO membership appears to allow us to compare
the impact of membership of NK with the membership of other NGOs, it should be
borne in mind that we are not comparing like with like. We know that NK members
have belonged to an NK group for averages of around ten years in one location and
16 years in the other. We do not have any information of years of membership of
other NGOs. Our most reliable comparison is between NK members and those
who do not belong to any NGO at all. We also controlled for differences related to
location which we proxied by our village dynamism index and a dummy variable
for those respondents living in Sagatha thana.
The survey was carried out at the end of 2007. Preliminary analysis of the survey
data was followed by a series of focus group discussions to explore some of the
quantitative findings in greater depth. In addition, we have drawn on earlier 
qualitative analysis of NK carried out by one of the authors to interpret some of
the survey findings (Kabeer 2003 and Kabeer with Haq Kabir 2009). 
3 Findings from the survey: poverty 
reduction, gender equality and 
good governance at the grassroots
3.1 The material dimensions of poverty
We begin our analysis by examining the evidence for impacts on poverty and
hence to the MDG agenda. Although NK does not engage in the direct provision
of credit or social services to its membership, it does seek to promote the capacity
of its members to bargain for better returns for their labour efforts, to press for their
entitlements from the state, to engage in regular savings activities and to participate
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in training in various practical matters, including health and environmental 
awareness. We would expect some of these efforts to bear fruit in the form of
concrete material impacts. 
Table 3.1a deals with landholdings, still regarded as a key asset in rural areas. We
have already noted that there was very little difference between members and non-
members in terms of inherited land. While NK members may have been somewhat
more likely than non-members to have acquired land through other means, such as
purchase, state allocation, lease and so on, both NK and non-NK members remain
within the ‘functionally landless’ category, although NK members did own more
homestead land than non-members. The difference, while small, is significant. 
Table 3.1a  Material dimensions of poverty: access to cultivable and
homestead land (mean size in decimals)
Access, ownership and Non-NK members NK members Sig.
cultivation of land
Land cultivated in past year 35.0 40.23 .167
Cultivable land owned 19.7 17.27 .422
Cultivable land purchased 4.33 5.87 .211
Cultivable land allotted .38 .60 .544
Cultivable land leased in 8.78 8.27 .746
Cultivable land sharecropped in 10.8 13.52 .139
Homestead land purchased .82 1.62 .003
Homestead land allotted .000 .15 .001
Homestead land otuli .14 .24 .200
Owned homestead land 5.2 7.2 .001
Table 3.1b reports on other assets. A productive asset index was calculated on
the basis of whether or not respondents owned one or more cows, goats, poultry,
rickshaws/vans and cycles while the consumer asset index measured whether or
not they owned one or more televisions, radios, beds, showcases or shindooks.
Each index thus took a value between 0 and 5. The table provides evidence of
positive impact. NK members were more likely than non-members to own 
producer assets (including cattle and goats), to own consumer assets, to own a
latrine and to have electricity. While they were considerably more likely to have
electricity, this may have reflected village level differences reported in Table 2.1. 
Table 3.1b also tells us that 100 per cent of NK members had savings and that 99
per cent of their savings were with their NK groups. This is not surprising since
routine saving is one of the basic activities of NK groups. 10 per cent of NK
groups also have savings in the bank. It is likely that many of the non-members
who reported savings were members of microfinance NGOs and kept their savings
with the NGO in question. 
According to Table 3.2, NK membership makes a difference to economic activity
rates but far more among women than men. 28 per cent of female NK members
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reported an economic activity as their primary occupation compared to just 6 per
cent of non members.  One reason why a slightly smaller percentage of female non-
members reported a secondary occupation than members (10 per cent compared
to 6 per cent) is that the former generally cited housework as their primary activity. 
Economically active women are largely concentrated in wage labour in other 
people’s homes, followed by trade/business, other forms of wage labour and
handicraft production. Men on the other hand are distributed more evenly between
cultivation, wage labour, trade/business and transport. It should be noted that 
definition of economic activity is confined to directly remunerated activities. It is
possible that many of the women classified as ‘inactive’ were in fact engaged in
homestead cultivation and rearing livestock and poultry. This is partly supported
by evidence (not shown here) that ‘economically inactive women’ were more likely
to report ownership of cattle and goats – but not poultry – as well as larger 
homestead landholdings, particularly among NK members and larger cultivated
holdings among non-NK members. 
Assets/activities Non-NK members NK members Sig.
Producer asset index 1.7 2.0 .000
Consumer asset index 1.9 2.2 .000
% owning cattle 32 44 .000
% owning goats 31 36  .047
% with electricity               23 44 .000
% cultivating irri crops 50 48 .233
% owning latrine 89 94 .002
% owning pucca latrine 76 83 .003
Has savings: 57 100 .000
With NK group 0 99 .000
With bank 6 10 .021
Cash at home 0 2 .036
In jewellery 1 3 .054
Non-NK members NK members Sig.
Male respondents with 92 98 .005 
primary economic occupation
Male respondents with 99 100 
secondary economic occupation
Female respondents with 6 28 .000
primary economic occupation
Female respondents with 10 6 
secondary economic occupation 
Table 3.1b  Material dimensions of poverty: assets and savings
Table 3.2  Material dimensions of poverty: economic activity rates
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Table 3.3 provides information on food security and quality of diet. NK membership
does not appear to have made much difference to food security of their 
households: around half of members and non-members had experienced food
shortages in the previous year for an average of around three months. While this
absence of impact on food security might appear to reflect NK’s failure to provide
any economic services to its membership, it is worth noting that an impact study
of BRAC (Kabeer and Matin 2005), which does provide microfinance and a range
of other economic services, also found little evidence of impact on food security
among new and old members: around a third of each group reported food 
shortage in the previous year.4 This suggests that household food security in the
countryside may be dependent on factors that are beyond the control of individual
NGOs. 
Table 3.3 Material dimensions of poverty: food security and diversity
of diet
4 The differences in percentages of BRAC members reporting food shortage in the previous year 
(around 30 per cent) and NK members (around 50 per cent) suggests that the BRAC microfinance 
programme draws its membership from a somewhat better off section of the poor than NK. In 
recognition of this exclusion, BRAC has now started a separate transfer programme for the very poor. 
Food indicators Non-NK members NK members Sig.
Food shortage experienced in 54 52 .527 
past year 
Mean number of months of 3.4 3.5 .344
food shortage
Meat eaten in past week 11 21 .000
Chicken eaten in past week 18 32 .000
Fish eaten in past week 93 97 .004
Milk eaten in past week 41 59 .000
Eggs eaten in past week 43 51 .014
Fruits eaten in past week 62 70 .009
Where NK membership does seem to have made a difference is in relation to
diversity of diet: the table suggests that they were systematically and significantly
more likely to have consumed meat, chicken, fish, milk, eggs and fruits in the 
previous week than non-members. The difference appears to reflect their stronger
asset position as well as their higher levels of economic activity. 
The results of logistic regression analysis of the impacts reported in this section
are reported in Table 3.4. As we noted earlier, the regression coefficients for the
different categories of NGO membership tell us whether the value of the ‘impact’
variable associated with different NGO membership categories are significantly
different from those associated with the reference category of ‘no NGO 
membership’. We summarise the findings from the regression analysis here and
discuss their interpretation in greater detail at a later stage of the paper. 
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 Our regression results confirmed the absence of impact in relation to 
experience of food shortage but supported the finding that NK membership 
increased the likelihood of a more diverse diet relative to non-NGO members.
This effect was stronger for those NK members who were also members of 
other NGOs. In other words, access to microfinance makes a difference to 
diversity of diet but only in combination with NK membership whereas NK 
membership makes a difference, even in the absence of access to 
microfinance. It is also evident from the table that access to cultivated land 
makes a difference to both indicators of food consumption: households with 
larger land holdings were more likely to report food security as well as greater
diversity of diet. As we might expect, there is greater food insecurity in the 
poorer thana of Sagatha and in the less dynamic villages.
 NK membership, on its own and in association with membership of other 
NGOs, was associated with greater likelihood of ownership of both producer 
and consumer assets relative to non-NGO members. This effect is not 
observed for those who are members of other NGOs only.
 NK membership, on its own and in association with other NGO membership, 
is associated with greater likelihood that the household has access to 
electricity, even when controls have been introduced for locational 
differences.
 NK membership, on its own and in association with other NGO membership, 
is associated with higher levels of economic activity relative to those who are 
not members of any NGO. This effect is not observed for those who are 
members of other NGOs only. These findings hold for the full sample as well 
as for the women only sample. 
Independent variables Age Sex Religion Education NK only NK plus Other Total Village Sagatha -2 Log Overall
Partly or fully trust other NGO land dynamism dummy likelihood percentage
only cultivation
Diet diversity .990 1.155 .615 1.345 1.902 3.289 1.229 1.010 1.142 1.239 1225.715 66
.072 .368 .061 .002 .000 .000 .382 .000 .019 .134
Own a consumer asset 1.003 1.346 .632 1.561 1.525 1.686 1.444 1.013 1.193 1.055 1081.408 75
.673 .093 .050 .000 .020 .064 .182 .000 .007 .729
Own a producer asset 1.003 1.236 1.067 1.025 2.011 1.692 1.322 1.006 1.014 1.687 1082.934 75
.610 .222 .794 .800 .000 .070 .324 .000 .821 .001
Own cattle 1.014 1.170 .980 1.016 1.707 1.413 .836 1.006 .972 1.433 1261.425 65
.014 .314 .929 .858 .001 .182 .487 .000 .613 .011
Goats 1.010 .933 1.963 .844 1.616 1.613 1.584 1.003 .904 .637 1234.394 67
.104 .666 .009 .066 .004 .069 .057 .029 .082 .002
Have electricity .998 1.029 .756 1.374 2.296 1.624 1.400 1.001 1.833 .242 1010.856 72
.775 .877 .255 .001 .000 .091 .236 .728 .000 .000
Pakka latrine 1.012 .765 .932 1.878 1.293 .852 .657 1.011 1.271 .596 926.909 79
.087 .157 .825 .000 .190 .941 .124 .000 .000 .003
Tlf p .985 146.953 1.355 .856 3.571 2.934 1.662 .997 1.025 3.010 661.029 87
.114 .000 .358 .282 .000 .004 .134 .132 .767 .000
Flfp 1.006 – 1.153 1.042 3.057 2.383 1.541 .981 1.056 3.323 470.398 78
.628 – .705 .826 .001 .038 .235 .000 .569 .000
Table 3.4  Regression analysis of variations in quality of diet, assets
and economic activity
IDS WORKING PAPER 333
24
3.2 Knowledge and practice in relation to government policy
The next set of impacts also have a bearing on the MDG agenda. They relate to
knowledge and access in relation to government provision. These are summarised
in Table 3.5. There are clearly high levels of knowledge across the sample 
population with regard to government programmes, with little difference between
NK and non-NK groups. Both groups are also equally likely to have immunised
children in the family. 
Table 3.5 Knowledge, attitudes, practice in relation to state policies
and legislation (in percentages)
State legislation and policies Non-NK NK Sig.
members members
Food Knowledge of VGD programme 99 100 .451
Knowledge of secondary school stipend 99 100 .249
Knowledge of old age pension 99 100 .624
Knowledge of widow’s pension 99 100 .124
Knowledge of a family getting any of these 37 40 .244
Knowledge of who is getting VGD card 82 88 .017
Belief that VGD card not properly distributed 28 33 .026
Action taken to ensure proper distribution 9 26 .000
Children immunised 90 92 .151
Ever-use of family planning 78 82 .207
Belief in secondary plus education for sons 94 98 .004
Belief in secondary plus education for daughters 93 96 .028
% of boys aged 5–14 with no education 33 33 .626
% of girls aged 5–14 with no education 36 26 .033
Legal age of marriage for girls < 18 years 5 3
Legal age of marriage = 18 years 57 62
Legal age of marriage > 18 years 39 35
Desired age to marry off daughter < 18 years 29 32
Desired age to marry off daughter = 18 years 32 27
Desired age to marry off daughter > 18 years 39 41
However, NK members are more likely to be aware of who is getting a VGD card,
are more likely to question whether cards are going to those who are entitled to
them and are significantly more likely to take action to ensure proper distribution.
Differences in educational aspirations for children were significant but small. And
while there is little difference in the percentage of boys aged 5–14 without any
education between the two groups, NK members are less likely to report girls
without any education. One troubling finding from the organisation’s perspective is
that although NK members were more likely to know that the legal age of marriage
for girls was 18, they were as likely as non-members to want to marry their 
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suggest, the desire to marry daughters off at an early age is partly a response to
anxieties about their security and reputation. It appears that membership of NK
has not allayed that anxiety. 
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Independent variables Age Sex Religion Education NK only NK plus Other Total Village Saghata -2 Log Overall
Dependent variables other NGO land dynamism dummy likelihood percentage
only cultivation
Children immunized .947 4.999 1.473 1.007 2.522 2.209 1.934 1.002 .921 .974 539.820 91
.000 .000 .281 .969 .002 .053 .090 .262 .409 .914
Ever used family planning .957 2.303 1.157 1.059 1.611 1.427 2.071 1.002 1.124 1.235 935.536 81
method  .000 .000 .591 .617 .015 .239 .017 .225 .084 .219
Aspiration for son’s 1.035 2.055 .000 1.462 1.834 5.089 .943 1.011 1.026 1.174 288.278 96
education .039 .079 .996 .152 .168 .129 .897 .131 .859 .649
Aspiration for daughter’s 1.024 1.691 .206 1.505 1.123 .716 .516 1.014 1.434 .913 388.943 94
education .067 .120 .127 .074 .747 .551 .094 .035 .001 .760
Legal age of female’s .994 1.109 1.213 1.314 1.503 .890 1.437 1.001 1.108 2.699 1274.262 64
marriage .282 .506 .397 .002 .011 .647 .131 .539 .071 .000
Preferred age of marriage 1.020 1.118 .694 1.223 .710 1.044 .923 1.001 1.019 .663 1197.098 69 
for daughter > 18 .002 .485 .157 .034 .041 .877 .745 .303 .742 .005
Table 3.6  Regression analysis of variations in knowledge and 
practices in relation to state policy 
Table 3.6 provides the results of logistic regression analysis for these impacts.
The results confirmed that NK membership did not make much difference to
knowledge of various government programmes and we do not report on these. As
far as the more significant findings are concerned: 
 The results suggest that NK membership increased the likelihood of child 
immunisation and ever-use of family planning but NGO membership, whether 
NK or otherwise, did not make much difference to the educational aspirations 
expressed for daughters (or sons). Instead, higher educational aspirations 
were more likely to be expressed in the more dynamic villages and by older 
and more educated respondents. 
 NK only members were more likely than the rest of the population to know the
legal age of marriage for daughters but also more likely to want to marry their 
daughters at below the legal age. 
3.3 Gender-related impacts: decision-making and public mobility 
The next set of tables examine the extent to which NK membership has made a
difference to women’s decision-making roles within the household and their mobility
in the public domain, two indicators which feature frequently in the analysis of
gender-related social change in the South Asian context. The decision-making
indicator relates to issues of concern within the household and distinguishes
between ‘joint decision-making’, ‘sole decision-making by the respondent, ‘sole
decision-making by spouse’ and ‘decisions made by others’. The mobility indicator
relates to unaccompanied mobility to some key locations outside the household.
While female respondents were asked to report on their own behaviour, male
responses related to their spouses. The responses by male respondents generally
showed weaker and less systematic patterns: this may reflect weaker impacts in
male respondent households or less accurate responses since they related to the
behaviour of female family members rather than themselves. We report here only
on responses by female respondents.
Table 3.7 presents the findings on the decision-making indicators. Given what we
generally know about the patriarchal nature of household relationships in
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Decision-making patterns by area of Non-NK NK 
decision-making females females
Children’s education
Others 4 8
Respondent 10 18
Spouse 4 3
Jointly 77 61
Health treatment
Others 4 6
Respondent 12 25
Spouse 9 6
Jointly 76 64
Income allocation
Others 3 8
Respondent 11 19
Spouse 14 6
Jointly 72 67
Purchase of land/large assets
Others 4 7
Respondent 8 17
Spouse 17 7
Jointly 71 69
Children’s marriage
Others 2 3
Respondent 8 17
Spouse 4 2
Jointly 83 72
Family planning
Others 1 4
Respondent 16 11
Spouse 0 1
Jointly 78 72
Table 3.7  Decision-making patterns within the household by gender
of respondent 
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Bangladesh, a remarkably high percentage of respondents, both NK members
and others, reported ‘joint decision-making’: over 60 per cent across the sample.
However, NK members were less likely to report decision-making by spouses or
others in the family and more likely to report making decisions on their own.5 This
is only partly explained by the somewhat higher percentages of female household
heads among NK members. It would appear therefore that female membership of
NK does have the effect of strengthening women’s capacity to take decisions on
their own. 
Table 3.8 reports on women’s ability to move unaccompanied in the public domain,
specifically to a health clinic, the market, UP office, committee meetings and 
shalish. Once again, we find evidence of impact. Women who belonged to NK
groups were systematically and significantly more likely than women non-members
to go unaccompanied to each of these locations. While highest percentages of
both groups of women report unaccompanied mobility in relation to health clinics,
a destination associated with women’s traditional family responsibilities, the 
considerable higher levels of unaccompanied mobility reported by NK women in
relation to markets, the Union Parishad office, the shalish as well as committee
meetings, is indicative of a greater break with tradition associated with NK 
membership. 
Table 3.8  Unaccompanied female mobility by domain
5 NK female members were also more likely to report sole decision-making than the spouses of male 
respondents in the sample, whether in NK or not. In general, differences in patterns of decision-making
between male respondents did not vary markedly by NK membership. 
Mobility domain Non-NK females NK females 
Health clinic 67 84
Market place 32 68
UP office 25 66
Committee meeting 1 18
Shalish 9 68
The final tables (Tables 3.9a and 3.9b) report on the results of regression analysis
of these impacts. Table 3.9a reports on the likelihood of sole decision-making by
our female respondents. It suggests that women who were ‘members of NK only’
were significantly more likely than all other categories of women, including NK
members belonging to other NGOs, to report sole decision-making. Table 3.9b
suggests that membership of an NGO, both NK and others, is associated with
greater likelihood of unaccompanied female mobility relative to women who are
not members of any NGO. 
3.4 Community participation and collective action 
We now turn to examples of impact that relate more directly to NK’s goals of
social mobilisation and political participation. We begin with various forms of 
participation in the associational life of the community. While these activities are
less visible in the public policy discourse around ‘good governance’, which tends to
be defined primarily in relation to state-civil society interactions, their implications
are likely to be as important for the quality of citizenship enjoyed by the poor as
more formal interactions with the state. 
The first indicator in Table 3.10 relates to membership of village committees.
These are informal committees, usually constituted on the basis of election by
those concerned with the relevant aspect of village life. It is evident from the table
that the landless are rarely elected to these committees but that NK membership
has made some difference: 16 per cent of NK members belonged to a village
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Independent variables Age Religion Education NK only NK plus Other Total Village Sagatha -2 Log Overall
Dependent variables other NGO land dynamism dummy likelihood percentage
only cultivation
Child education 1.001 1.944 .958 2.591 1.785 1.405 .999 1.050 1.009 393.979 86 
(.944) (.170) (.842) (.013) (.225) (.424) (.709) (.668) (.975)
Health 1.033 2.448 1.218 2.972 1.691 .858 .994 .921 .720 437.796 82
(.005) (.042) (.318) (.001) (.212) (.710) (.085) (.414) (.217)
Income 1.042 2.683 1.196 2.202 1.166 .969 .996 1.042 .775 395.405 85 
(.001) (.047) (.404) (.029) (.738) (.942) (.230) (.710) (.367)
Asset 1.049 1.753 1.077 2.346 1.295 .989 .997 1.010 .851 354.857 87
(.000) (.243) (.753) (.029) (.598) (.982) (.356) (.930) (.594)
Child marriage 1.048 2.084 .943 1.744 1.179 .744 .998 1.120 .796 346.882 87
(.000) (.149) (.812) (.154) (.732) (.545) (.579) (.361) (.454)
Family planning 1.023 1.885 .993 .670 .159 .583 .997 1.043 .542 374.664 86
(.080) (.273) (.976) (.252) (.002) (.146) (.353) (.723) (.032)
Table 3.9a  Regression analysis of variations in female role in decision-
making 
Independent variables Age Religion Education NK only NK plus Other Total Village Sagatha -2 Log Overall
Dependent variables other NGO land dynamism dummy likelihood percent-
only cultivation age
Health .995 1.156 1.416 3.294 3.781 2.050 .996 1.129 1.005 514.806 76
(.637) (.711) (.055) (.000) (.001) (.015) (.024) (.203) (.983)
Market 1.011 .910 1.846 7.640 5.239 2.085 .994 1.086 1.246 590.670 68
(.255) (.783) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.011) (.012) (.346) (.309)
UP office 1.012 1.178 1.636 9.641 8.362 2.237 .992 1.160 2.452 557.388 71
(.222) (.634) (.003) (.000) (.000) (.010) (.007) (.104) (.000)
Committee 1.050 2.754 3.458 454007600.167 420961254.008 49851665.934 .998 1.048 4.298 223.300 91
(.006) (.047) (.000) (.995) (.995) (.996) (.600) (.722) (.001)
Shalish 1.014 1.588 2.291 65.446 71.340 3.105 .993 1.143 4.758 402.802 82
(.254) (.223) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.023) (.058) (.224) (.000)
Table 3.9b  Regression analysis of variations in female mobility in
public domain 
committee compared to just 4 per cent of non-NK members. Although this is not
shown in the table, NK membership also made a difference to the kind of 
committee that landless people were elected to: NK members were found to be
distributed across bazaar committees, the school committees and the masjid
committees followed by the gram committee, health watch committee and so on.
By contrast, the majority of the small number of non-NK members who belong to
a village committee were in the masjid committee. 
The second indicator relates to whether or not a respondent had been approached
by others in their community for their advice or opinion, an indication that their
views were taken seriously: 79 per cent of NK members had been approached in
this way compared to 60 per cent of non-NK members. The third indicator relates
to participation in shalish proceedings. These are informal systems for dispensing
justice at the local level and a key means by which village elites have maintained
their power within the village community. The table tells us that 49 per cent of NK
members had been invited to attend a traditional shalish in the past five years
compared to just 19 per cent of non-members. 58 per cent had participated in a
group initiated shalish in the past five years compared to 10 per cent of non-
members. And 35 per cent had played an active role in a shalish in the past five
years compared to 10 per cent of non-members. In addition, NK as well as other
NGOs are also initiating their own shalish procedures, often because the verdict
of traditional shalish has not been seen as fair. 58 per cent of NK members had 
participated in a group initiated shalish compared to 10 per cent of non-members. 
Table 3.10  Participation in community associations and collective
action
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Indicators of association, action and beliefs
Membership of a village committee 4 16 .002
Approached by others for opinion or advice 60 79 .000
Invited to any traditional shalish in the past five years 19 49 .000
Participated in group initiated shalish in the past five years 10 58 .000
Played an active role in a shalish in past five years 10 35 .000
Participated in protest/movement in the past five years 3 74 .000
Participated in collective action to help other members 2 70 .000 
or non-members in their community 
Quality of justice improved in their community 50 87 .000
Quality of justice deteriorated in their community 28 9 .000
NK members are also more likely than non-members to have participated in 
various forms of collective action to claim their rights and to protest injustice. The
differences are both large and highly significant. 74 per cent of NK members have
participated in some form of collective action in the past five years compared to 3
per cent of non-members. 70 per cent have taken action to support fellow group
members or others within their village. Only 3 per cent of the control group had
participated in protests, campaigns and so on, making it clear that these forms of
collective action are not widespread in the study locations. 
The final rows in the table report on our respondents’ views about the quality of
justice in their community. Given widespread despair about governance issues in
Bangladesh, including governance issues in everyday life, the percentages
expressing the view that quality of justice has improved in their community is 
surprisingly high. Less unexpected is the fact that 87 per cent of NK members
expressed this view compared to 50 per cent of non-members. Only 9 per cent of
NK members expressed the view that there had been a deterioration compared to
28 per cent of non-members. The differences were highly significant in both cases. 
As we noted earlier in the paper, one reason for the selection of Sagatha and
Daudkandi was to compare an area where NK staff believed they had been 
relatively successful in mobilising groups to take collective action with one where
they had been less successful. Table 3.11 suggests that there were indeed higher
levels of collective action by NK members in Sagatha (81 per cent) compared to
those in Daudkandi (67 per cent) and that the differences were significant. While 
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Participated in collective action Sagatha Daudkandi Sig.
in past five years (%) (%)
Age of group: 0–5 years 75 (n=8) 67(n=9) .563
Age of group: 6–10 years 77 (n=51) 69 (n=162) .582
Age of group: 11–15 years 80 (n=46) 60 (n=53) .025
Age of group: 16+ years 83 (n=140) 75 (n=24) .255
All groups 81 (n=250) 67 (n=250) .000
Key mobilising issues
Claim land rights 52 10
Against rape 37 40
Homicide 23 74
Violence against women 20 30
Child marriage 20 6
Wage rate 15 1
Polygamy 11 1
Acid throwing 0 27
Main forms of collective action
Gathering/procession 92 97
Blockage 81 41
Taking control over land 37 4
Forming human chain 28 0
Filing case in court 24 3
Creating pressure 11 5
Awareness raising 10 2
Press conference 4 11
Table 3.11  Participation in collective action by thana and duration
of group membership
Sagatha groups were, on average, five years older than those in Daudkandi, the
table suggests that Sagatha members were more likely to have taken collective
action than groups in Daudkandi within each age-of-group category, suggesting
that length of group membership alone does not account for the differences.
There is a gradual but steady increase in percentages participating in collective
action by age of groups in Sagatha but a less consistent rise in Daudkandi. 
One explanation for the higher levels of collective action by Sagatha groups may
relate to the fact that their actions were largely related to land politics, which tends
to be prolonged and contentious in the context of Bangladesh. 52 per cent of NK
members in Sagatha reported land rights as the main issue around which they
had mobilised compared to just 10 per cent of members in Daudkandi. 74 per
cent of NK members in Daudkandi had mobilised around homicide compared to
23 per cent in Sagatha. This does not mean that there were more homicides in
Daudkandi. Staff members believed that it reflects the large numbers who had
been involved in protesting the murder of one of their members in the course of
defending the property of a local Hindu family from appropriation by a powerful
neighbour. If collective actions relating to rape and violence against women are
added together, then the widest mobilisations in both thanas were against gender-
based violence. It was reported by 100 per cent of NK members in Daudkandi and
88 per cent in Sagatha. 
The next set of indicators in the table relates to forms taken by collective action and
supports the view that land related mobilisation tends to be more confrontational
than other issues around which members had mobilised. While gatherings and
processions were equally frequently reported in both thanas, Sagatha groups
were more likely to report blockages, land occupation and forming human chains.
NK groups in Daudkandi, on the other hand, were more likely to file cases in court
and to call news conferences. On the basis of these findings, it would appear that
the criteria of success used by NK staff may need to be revised. Levels of 
collective action, and types of collective action, appear to reflect the kinds of
issues that are relevant to poor people in different areas of Bangladesh. If groups
in Daudkandi did not more mobilise as often as those in Sagatha, it was because
the issues that they mobilised around did not require such frequent and extended
actions. 
Table 3.12 reports on the results of logistical regression analysis of these various
impacts. It supports the findings from the cross-tabulations that NGO membership
in general, and NK membership in particular, was associated with higher levels of
community participation and collective action:
 NK membership, on its own and in association with other NGO membership, 
was associated with greater likelihood of membership of village committees. 
Other NGO members were not significantly more likely than those who did not
belong to any NGO to report such committee membership. 
 NGO members, whether associated with NK or other NGOs, were more likely 
to be approached by others in the village for their advice and opinion 
compared to those who did not belong to any NGO.
 NGO membership, both NK and others, was associated with the greater 
likelihood of being invited to an NGO-initiated shalish in the past five years and
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to have played an active role in a shalish. However, only NK membership, 
both on its own and in association with membership of another NGO, was 
associated with greater likelihood of invitation to a traditional shalish. Members
of other NGOs only were no more likely to be invited to such as a shalish
than those who did not belong to any NGO at all.
 NK membership, on its own and in association with membership of another 
NGO, was associated with the greater likelihood of participating in movements
and protests in the past five years than those who did not belong to any 
NGO. Membership of other NGOs did not make a significant difference. 
 NGO membership, of both NK and other organisations, were more likely than
non-members to have taken collective action to help others within the 
village. 
 Finally, NK membership, on its own and in association with other NGO 
membership, was associated with the greater likelihood of belief that the 
quality of justice had improved over time relative to non-NGO membership. 
Views expressed by members of other NGOs were not significantly different 
from non-NGO members. Conversely, NK only members were the least likely 
to believe that the quality of justice had deteriorated 
 As far as the other explanatory variables are concerned, the results suggest 
that age, gender, education, landholding and being a Muslim all reinforce the 
impacts of NGO membership, that collective action and community 
participation is (as expected) higher in Sagatha and that village-level 
characteristics did not make much of a difference to these impacts. 
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Independent variables Age Sex Religion Education NK only NK plus Other Total Village Sagatha -2 Log Overall
Dependent variables other NGO land dynamism dummy likelihood percentage
only cultivation
Seek opinion on particular 1.018 1.546 1.055 1.741 3.144 1.978 1.673 1.001 1.098 1.430 1126.462 71
issues (.006) (.010) (.838) (.000) (000) (.013) (.034) (.564) (.125) (.018)
Membership of a village 1.055 2.666 .971 1.866 3.111 2.437 1.069 1.001 1.062 3.573 556.686 88
committee (.000) (.000) (.929) (.000) (.000) (.052) (.911) (.557) (.501) (.000)
Invited to any traditional 1.028 3.254 1.717 1.840 5.943 3.824 .599 1.002 1.007 3.586 963.890 77
shalish in the past 5 years (.000) (.000) (.038) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.212) (.088) (.911) (.000)
Any group initiated shalish 1.023 3.513 2.199 1.282 14.646 17.200 .128 1.001 1.009 1.114 896.163 77
in the village in the past (.001) (.000) (.002) (.021) (.000) (.000) (.045) (.345) (.900) (.533)
Played any active role in a 1.039 3.184 2.078 1.931 6.079 5.110 .251 1.004 1.055 2.252 801.392 82
shalish in the past 5 years (.000) (.000) (.011) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.071) (.008) (.462) (.000)
Participated in any 1.011 .742 1.693 1.468 123.425 96.919 1.320 1.004 .926 1.905 694.563 85 
movement in last 5 years (.210) (.178) (.057) (.004) (.000) (.000) (.618) (.034) (.369) (.002)
Collective action to help other 1.011 1.076 1.146 1.370 174.233 170.479 3.062 1.005 1.003 1.741 691.784 84
members or non-members (.212) (.736) (.624) (.018) (.000) (.000) (.071) (.012) (.967) (.006)
Within the village Justice .988 1.600 .535 1.023 8.875 2.275 1.068 .999 1.022 .872 1060.052 90
Improved (.069) (.009) (.033) (.820) (.000) (.000) (.778) (.403) (.728) (.380)
Justice deteriorated 1.020 1.891 1.948 .947 .185 .605 1.270 1.000 1.033 1.211 865.232 82
(.005) (.002) (.069) (.627) (.000) (.133) (.385) (.996) (.649) (.280)
Table 3.12  Regression analysis of variations in community participation
and collective action
3.5  Impacts in the policy and political domain  
Table 3.13 provides some insights into the extent NK membership has made a 
difference within the political domain, including interactions with the state, key 
elements in the formation of formal citizenship identity and practice. It tells us, first
of all, that NK were far more knowledgeable about their constitutional rights than
non-members. As this is a fundamental part of the NK training, this is not an 
unexpected result, but it does constitute an important starting point for landless
groups to learn about their identities as rights-bearing citizens. It is evident that
knowledge relating to the name of the Prime Minister, locally elected officials and
the main political parties was widespread across the population, although it was
somewhat higher among NK members. The lowest levels of knowledge pertained
to the name of the local female Union Parishad member. The invisibility of female
members may reflect their lack of effectiveness but it also reflects the terms on
which they are elected: while there is a male UP member for each ward, female
members are elected by three wards, making it less likely that they will be able to
interact with their constituency. 
Table 3.13  Knowledge, attitudes and engagement in the political
and policy domain
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Non-NK NK Sig.
members members
Knew constitutional rights 62 84 .000
Knew name of party in power 82 87 .000
Knew name of PM 91 93 .441
Knew name of another party 85 90 .000
Knew name of local women UP member 71 76 .024
Knew name of UP chairman 92 97 .003
Knew name of male UP member 92 96 .021
Voted in the last national election 87 99 .000
Voted in the last local election 92 97 .000
Campaigned in the last national election 10 18 .001
Campaigned in the last local election 22 43 .000
Stood in the last local election 1 1 .505
Visited the UP headquarters in the past five 
years 31 49 .000
Consulted by governmental official in the last 4 15 .000 
five years
Approached a local government official in last 2 9 .000 
five years
Visited by the family planning visitor 34 43 .004
Visited by block supervisor 8 20 .000
Visited by the veterinary doctor 6 16 .000
Ever paid bribe 22 19 .308
Paid bribe in the past three years 15 12 .201
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Table 3.13 suggests that NK members were systematically more likely than non-
members to have voted in the last national and local elections, with the difference
being much larger for national than local elections. They were also far more likely
to have actively campaigned during both these elections, with higher percentages
reporting such involvement at the local elections. We did not come across much
evidence of either NK members or non-members standing for local elections,
although NK had fielded candidates for local elections – and won – in these areas. 
The table also provides strong evidence of engagement with local state structures
by NK members. They were significantly more likely to have visited UP headquarters;
to have been consulted by local government officials and to have approached
local government officials themselves; and to have been visited by various 
government extension service providers: family planning visitors, block supervisors
and veterinary officers. NK membership does not appear to offer protection from
demands for bribes: while lower percentages of NK members are likely to have
paid a bribe ever, or in the last three years, the differences are not significant.
The logistic regression results for this section of the analysis are reported in Table
3.14a and 3.14b. It suggests that introducing controls for individual, household
and locational characteristics does not significantly alter the findings reported in
cross-tabulation analysis. To summarise:
 NK membership, both on its own and in association with membership of other
NGOs, was associated with higher likelihood of knowledge of constitutional 
rights compared to those with no NGO membership. This was not the case for
those who were members of other NGOs only. 
 The effects of NGO membership on knowledge of national politics varied. Most
people knew the name of the prime minister and NGO membership made very
little difference to this. While members of NGOs, both NK as well as others, 
were more likely to be able to name the party in power than those who did not
belong to an NGO, NK members were more likely to name the opposition 
party as well. Membership of other NGOs only did not make much difference. 
Independent variables Age Sex Religion Education NK only NK plus Other Total Village Sagatha -2 Log Overall
Dependent variables other NGO land dynamism dummy likelihood percentage
only cultivation
Knowledge of rights .998 .299 1.395 1.504 3.934 5.560 .972 .998 1.055 3.139 1036.365 75
(.722) (.000) (.230) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.912) (.126) (.409) (.000)
Knew name of party in .983 8.243 1.134 1.857 1.703 2.683 1.649 .998 1.105 .717 734.425 84 
power (.038) (.000) (.707) (.000) (.023) (.006) (.085) (.335) (.1999) (.094)
Knew name of Prime .981 1.508 1.775 1.772 1.398 1.799 1.633 1.000 1.211 1.631 540.695 92 
Minister (.039) (.123) (.126) (.004) (.224) (.202) (.260) (.880) (.042) (.047)
Knew name of other party .973 8.020 1.177 2.606 1.762 2.603 1.316 .998 1.192 1.115 638.965 88
(.003) (.000) (.662) (.000) (.027) (.014) .375 .154 .154 (.613)
Knew name of local women 1.007 1.381 2.683 1.247 1.031 1.581 .814 .997 1.400 2.380 1078.113 75 
ward member .251   .065 .000 .030   .865 (.130) (.418) (.008) (.000) (.000)
Knew name of UP chairman 1.000 11.407 2.757 1.381 4.543 5.340 2.113 .999 .994 2.358 351.528 95
.996 .000 .026 .163 .001 .003 .066 .549 .962 (.007)
Knew name of local ward 1.014 6.103 3.353 1.232 2.645 2.700 1.272 .999 1.073 .788 400.802 94
member (.281) (.000) (.003) (.306) (.011) .060 (.530) (.506) (.558) (.407)
Table 3.14a  Regression analysis of variations in political awareness
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 As far as local elected officials were concerned, NGO membership, both NK 
and other, made a difference to knowledge of the name of the UP chairman 
but NK members were more likely than others to know the name of the male 
UP member. 
 NGO members, both NK and others, were generally more likely to have voted
in the last national election than those who did not belong to any NGO. ‘NK 
only’ membership was associated with a higher likelihood of voting in the last 
local election than the rest of the population. NK only membership was 
associated with higher probability of campaigning in the last national election 
while NK membership, both on its own and in association with other NGO 
membership, was associated with higher probability of campaigning in the last
local election. NGO membership did not appear to affect the likelihood of 
standing in local elections. 
 NK only members were more likely than the rest of the population to have 
visited UP headquarters in the past five years and to have approached a 
government official. Government officials, on the other hand, were more likely 
to have consulted with NGO members, both NK and others, than non-NGO 
members. Similarly, government extension service providers were more likely 
to visit NGO members, both NK and others, than non-members. 
 Our findings confirm that NGO membership, neither NK nor others, had little 
effect on the likelihood of having to pay a bribe. 
Independent variables Age Sex Religion Education NK only NK plus Other Total Village Sagatha -2 Log Overall
Dependent variables other NGO land dynamism dummy likelihood percentage
only cultivation
Vote in last national election 1.087 2.662 2.080 .770 4.936 3.432 2.025 .997 1.207 2.418 446.600 92
(.000) (.001) (.074) (.091) (.000) (.019) (.049) (.160) (.098) (.001)
Vote in last local election 1.100 1.810 .980 .634 2.423 1.693 1.220 .996 1.241 3.823 328.675 95
(.000) (.112) (.970) (.010) (.040) (.401) (.640) (.121) (.114) (.000)
Campaign in last national .973 85.389 1.983 1.015 20.34 1.998 1.484 1.004  1.142 2.049 584.062 86
election (.002) (.000 (.090) (.901) (.002) (.188) (.579) (.015) (.118) (.001)
Campaign in last local .988 3.865 1.306 1.232 3.214 2.238 .704 1.001 .979 1.614 1094.199 69
election (.058) (.000) (.284) (.025) (.000) (.007) (.304) (.634) (.722) (.002)
Stand in the last local 1.067 .586 2.133 3.905 1.687 .000 .000 .997 1.094 1.956 73.075 99 
election (.014) (.579) (.508) (.001) (.512) (.997) (.996) (.660) (.777) (.398)
Ever approached any local 1.029 .821 1.408 2.074 4.214 1.563 .679 .999 1.106 1.618 384.687 94
government official (.012) (.548) (.429) (.000) (.000) (.488) (.632) (.737) (.404) (.109)
Consulted Government 1.023 .325 .903 1.614 8.168 4.902 3.791 .996 1.177 1.943 533.041 97
official (.023) (.000) (.753) (.001) (.000) (.002) (.009) (.158) (.099) (.007)
Visited family planning .972 .347 1.012 1.118  1.735 2.856 1.653 1.004 1.018 1.900 1177.018 68
officer (.000) .000 (.961) (.232) (.002) (.000) (.036) (.001) (.766) (.000)
Visited Block Supervisor 1.026 2.044 2.234 1.499 2.704 2.923 .285 1.004 1.179 1.290 692.686 87
(.001) .002 (.020) (.001) (.000) (.004) (.096) (.001) (.053) (.210)
Visited Veterinary officer 1.019 1.144 1.094 1.452 2.252 1.600 .259 1.003 1.423 2.110 602.561 89
(.034) .581 (.781) (.004) (.002) (.253) (.076) (.056) (.000) (.001)
Ever had to pay a bribe 1.017 1.358 1.671 1.239 .880 .894 1.297 1.005 1.072 .699 968.999 80
(.014) .113 (.083) (.032) (.505) (.726) (.363) (.000) (.321) (.033)
Had to pay bribe in the 1.002 .800 2.098 .835 8.28 .825 1.312 1.004 1.116 .671 779.893 86
past 3 years (.779) .308 (.062) (.164) (407) (.592) (.372) (.002) (.176) (.041)
Table 3.14b  Regression analysis of variations in political behaviour
 As far as the other explanatory variables are concerned, where age, gender, 
education and religion made a difference, it was generally the older, male, 
more educated and Muslim respondents who reported higher levels of political 
knowledge and activity. Size of landholding affected likelihood of extension 
services. Finally, belonging to Sagatha was likely to reinforce the effects of 
NK membership. 
3.6  Changing views about society and social justice
We next examine the extent to which membership of NK had changed its 
membership’s views about the society around them. One set of questions related
to levels of trust expressed by members and non-members towards a variety of
institutions and institutional actors that impinge on their lives. A second set related
to their views about different models of economic justices that were posed by the
questionnaire. A third set explored whether or not NK members believed that the
organisations’ activities have had any impact in the lives of the wider community
beyond themselves and fellow group members. 
As we noted earlier, there is a strong presumption in the civil society literature, 
primarily influenced by theories about social capital, that participation in 
associations generate high levels of generalised trust among their membership
and help to democratise public life and improve the quality of governance.
However, it was immediately clear from responses to an initial general question
on this issue that NK membership did not generate these expected levels of 
generalised trust. In fact, asked to choose between the statement ‘you can 
generally trust people’ and ‘you have to be careful when dealing with people’, only
26 per cent of NK members and 32 per cent of non-members agreed that you
could generally trust people while 74 per cent of NK and 68 per cent of non-
members believed you had to be careful dealing with people. The differences
were statistically significant. 
Further questions allowed us to explore attitudes of trust towards more specific
examples of institutions/institutional actors: respondents could choose between
‘fully trust’, ‘partly trust’, ‘don’t trust’ and ‘don’t know’. The results are reported in
Table 3.15. They generally confirm that NK members were far more cautious in
expressing trust in relation to different institutions and institutional actors than non-
NK members. Indeed, the default option for NK members in relation to almost the
examples that featured in these questions was the more conditional ‘partial’ trust
whereas non-members were much more likely to express ‘full trust’. This meant
that when those expressions of partial and full trust were combined as a single
category indicating ‘some level of trust’, the difference between the two groups
was reduced for most categories. It nearly disappears for particular categories
within the community: members of one’s own and extended family, neighbours,
people of one’s own and other religions and for the village shalish. Differences
greater than 10 percentage points remain for other categories. NK members are
less likely than non-members to express trust in the village iman or purohit (86 per
cent compared to 98 per cent), in quack healers (23 per cent compared to 40 per
cent), in village moneylenders (39 per cent compared to 49 per cent) and in local
landlords (56 per cent compared to 80 per cent). 
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Non-NK members    NK members
Don’t Partly Fully Partly Don’t Don’t Partly Fully Partly Don’t 
trust trust trust or fully know trust trust trust fully or know
trust
Community
Own family 1 4 95 99 – 2 14 84 98 – .09
Extended family 1 38 61 99 – 7 55 38 93 – .000
Neighbour 2 71 27 98 – 6 78 16 94 – .001
Own religion 1 30 69 99 – 3 49 47 97 – .03
Other religion 40 34 18 53 7 43 44 12 56 1 ---
Village imam 2 14 84 98 – 14 25 60 86 – .000
Jhar-phuk 60 23 17 40 0 76 14 10 23 0 .000
Traditional shalish 13 27 54 81 6 16 30 52 83 2 ---
Mahajan 48 17 32 49 3 59 18 21 39 1 .001
Matabbar 19 33 46 80 2 43 37 20 56 1 .000
State
MP 6 13 37 50 45 32 18 17 35 33 .000
UP chairman 21 31 44 75 4 40 33 25 59 1 .000
Female ward 20 31 38 69 11 35 33 28 61 4 .005
members
Male ward 23 29 44 74 3 39 35 24 59 1 .000
member
Block supervisor 4 5 30 35 61 25 17 23 40 35 .07
FP visitor 6 27 45 72 22 19 37 35 72 9 ----
Veterinary visitor 6 11 27 39 56 25 23 21 43 31 .07
Local police 19 27 50 77 4 40 32 27 60 1 .000
UP shalish 9 24 37 61 30 23 34 38 72 5 .000
Court kachari 13 17 38 55 32 39 23 26 49 12 .04
NGOs
NK group 2 4 17 21 77 0 15 85 99 0 .000
members
Other NGO group 9 30 43 73 18 47 30 20 50 3 .000 
members
NK staff 3 4 17 21 76 1 5 94 99 38 .000
Other NGO staff 8 25 47 72 20 48 24 23 47 4 .000
NGO shalish 8 5 25 30 62 13 16 67 83 4 .000
Table 3.15  Trust towards institutions and institutional actors
NK members are also considerably less likely than non-members to express trust
towards certain state actors: differences greater than 10 percentage points were
reported for Members of Parliament, Union Parishad chairmen, male ward 
members and the local police. Differences are smaller and variable as far as 
government extension service providers and the courts are concerned. NK 
members express higher levels of trust than non-members towards the UP shalish. 
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As far as the NGO sector is concerned, it is worth noting that the levels of trust
expressed by NK members towards other NK members and NK staff are as high
as they express towards their own families. They also express high levels of trust
towards NGO initiated shalish which are presumably mostly initiated by their own
members: 83 per cent compared to 30 per cent among non-members. However,
they are far less trusting towards other NGO members, than even non-NK 
members (50 per cent compared to 73 per cent) and towards other NGO staff (47
per cent compared to 72 per cent). 
The pattern of ‘don’t know’ responses also carries interesting information. Our
focus group discussions suggest that they implied a lack of familiarity with 
particular institutions/institutional actors rather than not knowing whether to trust
them. Non-NK members were generally more likely than NK members to give a
‘don’t know’ response: their highest frequency of ‘don’t knows’ was in relation to
NK group members and NK staff, NGO-led shalish, block supervisors, veterinary
visitors, their MP, UP shalishes and the courts. NK members were least familiar
with MPs, block supervisors and veterinary officers. 
The responses of non-members suggests higher levels of trust towards ‘other NGO’
group members and staff than expressed by NK members and much lower levels
of trust in NGO shalish. However, non-members appear to have very low levels of
knowledge about NK: around 75 per cent opted for the ‘don’t know’ option in 
relation to both NK staff and group members. This is partly because they were
selected from villages in which NK was not active – although other NGOs were.
Our field interviews suggested that another contributory factor may have been that
NK refers to the groups it organises, and its groups refer to themselves, as 
members of Bhumiheen Samity (Landless Society) rather than as Nijera Kori
groups. FGDs suggested that non-NK members were more likely to have heard of
the Landless Samity than of NK.
The much higher percentage of NK members who knew about the courts reflects
the fact that use of litigation has become an increasingly common means by
which those in power seek to harass opponents or undermine resistance. Many
NK groups have had false cases lodged against them by local landlords. It also
reflects the fact that NK members are more likely to take a criminal case to court if
the traditional shalish does not deliver a fair verdict. Similarly, lower levels of
knowledge among non-NK about non-traditional forms of shalish (both UP and
NGO-initiated) suggest fewer of such shalishes were conducted in their villages. 
Tables 3.16a, 3.16b and 3.16c report on the results of logistic regression analysis
of these impacts. The differences in expressions of generalised trust between NK
and non-NK members become insignificant, suggesting that it is variations in age
and gender that account for the main differences in expressions of generalised
trust. As far are some of the other institutions/actors are concerned, the regression
results tell us the following:
 Within the community, NK membership, both on its own and in association 
with other NGO membership, is associated with lower likelihood of ‘full or 
partial trust’ than the reference category of ‘no NGO membership’ in relation to
immediate and extended family, neighbours, the iman/purohit, village quacks, 
the village moneylenders and the local landlords. Differences in levels of trust 
towards people of own and other religions were not significant. 
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Independent variables Age Sex Religion Education NK only NK plus Other Total Village Sagatha -2 Log Overall
Partly or fully trust other NGO land cul- dynam- dummy likeli- percent-
only tivation ism hood age
Overall Trust 1.015 2.238 .887 .894 .799 .697 1.526 .999 .953 1.258 1150.527 72
.011 .000 .628 .232 .181 .236 (.101) .513 .420 .122
Own family 1.066 14.370 .493 1.093 .314 .218 31694815.608 1.009 1.888 1.556 110.499 99
.029 .012 .528 .841 .097 .086 (.996) .442 .002 .502
Extended family .995 1.473 .725 .744 .174 .116 .912 1.006 1.054 .416 319.308 96  
.740 .288 .510 .146 .001 .000 (.916) .193 .668 .015
Neighbour 1.024 1.590 .294 .821 .272 .219 1.642 .999 1.17 .483 302.387 96 
.123 .213 .108 .356 .003 .011 (.545) .857 .220 .053
Own religion 1.008 .705 .553 1.039 .421 .282 .707 .998 .828 .606 218.560 98
.681 .467 .447 .887 .117 .089 (.699) .543 .307 .250
Other religion 1.005 2.367 .172 1.114 .795 1.046 .668 1.000 1.057 .931 1269.595 64 
.345 .000 .000 .229 .150 .862 (.089) .838 .324 .610
Imam .991 2.848 .351 .654 .124 .165 2.076 .998 .975 .523 486.028 92
.414 .000 .017 .006 .000 .000 (.362) .244 .799 .014
Fakir .995 .946 .643 .745 .542 .321 1.459 1.001 .945 2.337 1163.120 70
.429 .733 .072 .003 .000 .000 (.111) .287 .332 .000
Village matabar 1.013 3.291 .525 1.010 .305 .205 1.095 .997 1.014 1.198 1110.479 76
.043 .000 .011 .916 .000 .000 .724 .010 .820 .237
Mahajan 1.001 22.370 .783 .917 .397 .535 .605 .998 1.108 1.125 924.146 81  
.854 .000 .393 .408 .000 .061 .116 .145 .146 .491
Gram shalish 1.003 3.454 .536 .964 1.161 .873 1.000 .998 .937 2.733 849.668 82
.690 .000 .054 .758 .502 .657 1.000 .121 .402 .000
Table 3.16a  Regression analyses of variations in trust towards family
and community
Independent variables Age Sex Religion Education NK only NK plus Other Total Village Sagatha -2 Log Overall
Partly or fully trust other NGO land dynamism dummy likelihood percentage
only cultivation
Union chairman 1.006 3.194 .767 .955 .421 .322 1.078 .998 1.086 .765 1163.581 69
.326 .000 .270 .629 .000 .000 .762 .163 .173 .071
Male ward member 1.002 4.101 .792 .914 .474 .324 1.135 .997 1.095 .732 1142.446 69
.715 .000 .337 .351 .000 .000 .606 .021 .139 .038
Female ward member .999 3.822 1.146 .872 .727 .325 .941 .998 1.158 1.059 1170.562 67
.808 .000 .564 .148 .069 .000 .798 .172 .016 .697
Court 1.002 4.458 .740 1.031 .640 .671 .837 .998 1.113 1.122 1248.767 66
.735 .000 .195 .736 .007 .125 .454 .061 .065 .418
Police 1.005 2.154 .681 .963 .377 .343 .928 .999 1.084 1.884 1164.136 70
.398 .000 .114 .693 .000 .000 .769 .642 .183 .000
Upazilla shalish 1.013 8.058 1.177 .920 1.362 1.931 .838 .998 1.190 1.707 1047.196 75
.053 .000 .521 .421 .104 .019 .477 .103 .008 .001
Block Supervisor 1.028 11.851 .954 1.148 .995 .844 .139 .997 1.143 .749 937.832 78
.000 .000 .861 .174 .978 .595 .000 .087 .048 .083
Family Planning visitor .996 5.063 .410 1.099 .740 .962 .931 .999 1.141 1.183 1063.360 72
.552 .000 .002 .372 .107 .891 .769 .451 .039 .288
Veterinary 1.024 5.359 .667 1.115 .925 .381 .122 .996 1.160 1.333 1062.384 73
.000 .000 .112 .260 .643 .002 .000 .002 .018 .065
MP 1.013 6.952 .900 1.110 .498 .331 1.314 .997 1.028 .610 1119.037 72
.036 .000 .680 .263 .000 .000 .284 .064 .657 .001
Table 3.16b  Regression analysis of variations in trust towards state
institutions and actors
 In relation to the state, NK membership, both on its own and along with other 
NGO membership, is associated with lower likelihood of full or partial trust in 
relation to the Member of Parliament, Union Parishad Chairman, male and 
female ward members and the police. However, it is associated with higher 
likelihood of full and partial trust in relation to UP shalish. Differences with 
regard to government extension officers are not significant.
 As far as the NGO sector is concerned, the regression results confirm that 
membership of NK, on its own or along with other NGO membership, is 
associated with higher levels of trust in other NK group members and of NK 
staff compared to the rest of the population. Interestingly, NK members who 
also belong to other NGOs, differ significantly in their attitudes to other NGO 
group members and staff: while NK only members were less likely to express 
some form of trust towards these categories than non-NGO members, those 
who belonged to these other NGOs were more likely to express trust, 
regardless of whether they were NK members or not. Clearly membership of 
other NGOs increases levels of trust towards these other NGOs. 
 Where other explanatory variables were concerned, respondents who were 
older and male were generally more likely to express trust but the education 
variable did not generally play a significant role in our results. Religion was 
sometimes significant but not systematically in any direction. Trust levels 
tended to be higher in the more dynamic villages in relation to community, 
state and NGO actors but findings varied as far as thana location was 
concerned. 
We also explored the views of our respondents towards different models of social
justice. We asked them to state their views regarding the following models, based
on different principles of income distribution: 
 a society where everyone earns the same income (the egalitarian model) 
 a society where everyone earns whatever they are able to (merit-based 
model) 
 a society where a maximum ceiling is imposed on what people can earn 
(maximum ceiling)
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Independent variables Age Sex Religion Education NK only NK plus Other Total Village Sagatha -2 Log Overall
Partly or fully trust other NGO land dynamism dummy likelihood percentage
only cultivation
NGO’s shalish 1.011 4.891 .857 1.096 10.238 33.173 1.033 .998 1.283 1.139 952.948 77
.117 .000 .598 .387 .000 .000 .913 .183 .000 .445
NK groups 1.021 11.518 1.002 1.410 2261.254 3256.410 .845 .997 1.011 3.619 423.646 91
.034 .000 .998 .020 .000 .000 .730 .175 .912 .000
Other NGO groups 1.002 1.701 .672 1.078 .292 2.446 25.922 .996 1.231 .540 1085.257 72
.692 .001 .111 .432 .000 .005 .000 .008 .001 .000
NK staff 1.016 18.826 .740 1.302 2930.141 4120.174 1.320 .997 1.070 3.444 418.301 90
.107 .000 .549 .074 (.000) .000 .583 .171 .504 .000
Other NGO staff 1.007 2.065 .706 1.011 .261 2.448 18.188 .996 1.240 .608 1095.558 71
.270 .000 .157 .910 .000 .003 .000 .006 .001 .001
Table 3.16c  Regression analysis of variations in trust towards NGO
sector
Models of Strongly Agree Disagree Don’t Sig. Preferred model Sig
economic agree know of economic
justice justice
Egalitarian Egalitarian .00
Non-NK 56 21 24 0 .000 42
NK 73 15 12 0 62
Merit-based Merit-based
Non-NK 13 25 61 0 .026 8 .01
NK 13 18 69 0 13
Maximum Maximum .03
ceiling ceiling
Non-NK 16 33 51 0 .386 5
NK 12 33 54 1 2
Minimum floor Minimum floor
Non-NK 25 31 44 0 .004 13 .32
NK 21 23 54 1 11
State welfare State welfare 
Non-NK 58 30 12 0 .000 32 .00
NK 36 31 33 0 12
 a society where a minimum floor is placed below which incomes cannot fall 
(minimum floor)
 a society where there were no limits to what people can earn, but the 
government helps the poor (state welfare).
Responses to each of these models could range from ‘strong agreement’, 
‘agreement’, ‘disagreement’ to ‘don’t know’. The results are presented in Table 3.17.
We find that NK and non-NK members hold very different views on their preferred
model. NK members show a strong preference for the egalitarian model: 73 per cent
expressed strong agreement with it, the highest percentage for any of the models.
This is not surprising, given the egalitarian values of the organisation. 36 per cent
expressed strong support for government assistance to the poor and 21 per cent for
the idea of a minimum floor. Non-NK members were more evenly divided between
the egalitarian model (56 per cent in strong agreement) and government assistance
to the poor (58 per cent). 25 per cent expressed support for the idea of a minimum
floor. However, both groups expressed strong aversion to the merit-based model
which was also seen as the least egalitarian: 69 per cent of NK members and 61
per cent of non-NK. The final column of the table presents the model most 
preferred by each group. It can be seen that NK members were significantly more
likely than non-members to opt for the egalitarian model (62 per cent compared to
42 per cent) while non-NK members were most likely to opt for government 
assistance to the poor (32 per cent compared to 12 per cent). NK’s egalitarian 
philosophy clearly helps to explain the strong preference for egalitarianism expressed
by its members, but our findings suggest that aversion to unbounded inequality
appears to be widespread among the poor, regardless of NGO membership.
Table 3.17  Visions of the just society
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The results of logistic regression analysis of these variables are reported in Table
3.18. They confirm that NK only members were significantly more likely than non-
NGO members to express agreement with the egalitarian model. They were less
likely to express agreement with the minimum income model and with government
assistance to the poor. In terms of preferred model of economic justice, NGO
members generally were more likely to express preference for the egalitarian
model than non-NGO members, regardless of whether they belonged to NK or
not. NK members, including those belonging to other organisations, were more
likely than non-NK members to express a preference for the merit-based model.
NGO members generally, whether or not they belonged to NK, were less likely to
opt for government assistance as their preferred model of justice. 
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Independent variables Age Sex Religion Education NK only NK plus Other Total Village Sagatha -2 Log Overall
Dependent variables other NGO land dynamism dummy likelihood percentage
only cultivation
Egalitarian .989 .323 1.089 .846 2.576 1.723 1.550 1.004 1.115 .852 857.378 82
.111 .000 .778 .114 .000 .143 .208 .016 .123 .367
Merit-based 1.009 .344 .566 1.029 .599 .863 .993 .999 .941 .881 1215.910 66
.124 .000 .012 .759 .003 .567 .974 .675 .302 .381
Maximum ceiling .990 6.397 1.466 .856 .895 1.392 1.436 1.002 1.018 1.031 1223.456 69
.087 .000 .107 .082 .503 .221 .139 .185 .760 .832
Minimum floor .994 13.045 1.097 .988 .597 .507 1.200 1.002 .999 .746 1049.167 77 
.373 .000 .729 .904 .005 .026 .476 .188 .990 .085
Government assistance .995 1.524 1.55 .782 .302 .205 .922 1.001 1.003 .786 996.195 77
.440 .021 .548 .015 .000 .000 .799 .699 .968 .143
Table 3.18  Regression analysis of variations in visions of the just society
Our final set of questions were addressed to NK members only. The first set of
questions related to whether or not they believed that NK’s activities had led to
any changes in the lives of the wider community beyond themselves and their
group members. If they believed it had, they were asked to list the three most
important changes and to state whether the change had been positive or negative.
Over 98 per cent of both women and men believed that there had been impacts in
the wider community and of these, around 95 per cent said that the changes in
question had been positive. The 5 per cent that cited negative impacts were most
likely to be women. Table 3.19  reports on the changes that figured most frequently
among the three most important changes cited by NK members. The results are
disaggregated by gender as it is evident that women and men did not have 
identical views about the most important changes. 
It is evident from the table that men outnumbered women in almost all the most
frequently cited examples of change. Thus, the most widely reported area of
impact by both women and men related to the quality of justice, but it was reported
by 70 per cent of male NK members compared to 50 per cent of female. The 
second more frequently cited impact by both related to the voices of the poor: this
was reported by 48 per cent of men and 39 per cent of women. Women and men
varied in the order of frequency with which they reported other areas of impact. In
the case of men, the next most frequently mentioned impacts were incidence of
dowry (35 per cent), children’s education (27 per cent), levels of corruption (24 per
cent) and incidence of public violence against women (21 per cent). The order for
women was female mobility in the public domain (46 per cent), the incidence of
domestic violence (38 per cent) and incidence of conflict (21 per cent). There is
an interesting divergence of views between women and men with regard to NK’s
impact on gender discrimination. While 35 per cent of men believed that NK had a
general impact on dowry, only 11 per cent of women did so, and some of these
believed it had gone up. Many more men than women believed that there had
been a reduction in public violence against women but many more women
believed this to be the case with domestic violence. 
3.7 What does ‘trust’ mean in the context of Bangladesh: a 
qualitative interpretation
The findings on trust – and the high levels of mistrust expressed by NK members
– warrant further discussion in view of the central place accorded to ‘trust’ in the
literature on civil society and democracy. As we noted in the introduction, trust is
generally taken as a positive feature of social relations in the literature on social
capital associated with the work of Putnam and others, evidence that the institutions
work effectively and transparently. However, given widespread agreement in 
academic research, international policy circles and national media that many of the
institutions in Bangladesh are permeated by corruption, nepotism and rent-seeking,
it is by no means self-evident that ordinary citizens of Bangladesh should express
any level of trust at all in their institutions. Yet, as a survey by Rahman (2007)
found, a high percentage of ordinary citizens expressed strong to moderate levels
of trust in their governments and its institutions. 
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Table 3.19  NK impact in the wider community: beyond individuals
and groups
Female Male Sig.
Quality of justice 50 70 .000
Children’s education 17 27 .009
Voices of the poor heard 39 48 .031
Consulted by government 2 3 .772
Levels of corruption 7 24 .000
Levels of exploitation 3 1 .105
Spread of fundamentalism 0 6 .000
Incidence of dowry 11 35 .000
Incidence of hilla marriage 2 4 .602
Incidence of domestic violence 38 17 .000
Incidence of public violence against women 15 21 .081
Incidence of female mobility 46 4 .000
Incidence of conflict 21 8 .000
Incidence of collective action 1 1 1.00
Incidence of marital instability 2 2 .543
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Analysis by Hossain (2008) offers a possible explanation for this. Her study
attempts to explain the ‘moderate degree of trust’ expressed towards government
by low income groups in Bangladesh, despite its well documented levels of 
corruption and rent-seeking. She starts from the premise that assessments of how
government institutions perform is likely to vary across different groups in society,
both because different groups have different values and expectations of 
government and because government performance will impact on their lives in 
different ways. As Chatterjee (2004) has suggested, the political preoccupations
of poor people are with resources: ‘the politics of getting on the list for service
delivery’. They are likely to be different from – and at odds with – the political 
preoccupations of elite civil society. It is only once a basic level of material well-
being is reasonably assured that the preoccupation with how governments 
contribute to this will recede and ‘post-materialist values’ emerge, including, among
other things, a more critical awareness of political processes. This awareness may
also result from parallel processes of rising access to education and information. 
Hossain suggests that one reason for the unexpected levels of trust expressed by
ordinary citizens, including its poorer ones, relates to the reasonable degree of
performance by the Bangladesh government and civil society on the delivery of
some of the basic goods that matter to people: health, education, poverty reduction
programmes, infrastructure. It is largely elite sections of Bangladesh civil society
that are most actively engaged in the critique of government corruption and failures. 
From this perspective, the levels of mistrust expressed by NK group members
makes considerable sense. It suggests that while they may be preoccupied with
access to basic resources like other sections of the poor, they have also 
participated in a fairly intensive process of education and information sharing
which has given them a level of consciousness about the political process not 
typically found in the rest of their class. It has given them a view of government
institutions and other institutions of power that is not that distant from those of civil
society elites and the donor community in Bangladesh. 
This explanation was given some support by the focus group discussions that
were carried out with NK and non-NK members after preliminary analysis of the
survey in order to investigate how they interpreted trust and what lay behind
expressions of trust and mistrust. The meaning given to trust did not appear to
vary a great deal between members and non-members. For both, it carried 
connotations of dependability, reliability and transparency. According to one
female NK member:
Trust means to be able to depend on someone (astha), they have some 
quality. I can understand if they have that quality through what they do. If
someone takes a loan from and returns it in due time, then I will be able to
trust them in future. I will lend them more money. But if someone is supposed
to go somewhere by 10 o’clock, if they don’t go on time, then I will lose trust
in them. This is what I think trust is: there should be a ‘fit’ between what you
say and what you do. 
A non-NK member said, ‘Trust is not based on just listening to words but knowing
what is in people’s minds’. For others, trust was inspired by observing that people
lived up to what was required of them: ‘The vet comes and treats our animals. He
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does his work so we trust him’. For one non-NK member, lack of trust reflected
the absence of transparency:
Trust is not based on just listening to words but knowing what is in people’s
minds. I don’t trust those I do not know. I do not know the mind of the 
government, but I feel it wants the public good. But the police, army, BDR,
they all take bribes. They squander what the government sends us. 
For some respondents, trust was simply associated with general virtue. As one
NK member put it: ‘I will have trust in the person I have known for long enough to
know he will never harm anyone. He follows the path of honesty’.
While the meaning given to trust did not vary between NK and non-NK groups,
their expressions of trust towards different groups did. The focus group discussions
suggested that the tendency of NK members to express qualified rather than
absolute trust as their default mode reflected a more ‘active’ view of trust, the view
that trust had to be earned by the behaviour of different institutional actors rather
than extended automatically. This caution applied as much to those close to them
as to those in authority. 
For instance, in relation to their neighbours, an NK member said: ‘You can trust
some neighbours, not others. It is all a question of individuals. Those I get on
with, I trust’. Another said, ‘Whether we trust our neighbours will depend on their
actions, some are friends, some are enemies. All are not the same’. Of the 
mattabars, an NK member said, ‘We don’t trust all mattabars, some are good,
some are bad’. Another said: ‘I may respect the matabbar but to trust him, that will
depend on his activities’. A third said: 
Overall we do not trust Chairmen but we trust this one as he is from this area.
He is doing something for poor people. The Member is also good, he is a
member of our Bhumiheen samity. We don’t trust the female ward member
because she took money from us for the VGD card. We accused her and she
had to pay back the money.
However, there was unequivocal hostility towards the police:
The police are already outside the list of trust and honour. There is no 
question of trusting or not trusting the police of Bangladesh. Their activities
are of a different order. We have nothing to do with them.
The higher levels of trust expressed by non-NK members compared to NK 
members with regard to various institutions also expressed a more ‘passive’ 
articulation of trust. In some cases, it appeared to reflect willingness to accept a
given state of affairs. Of neighbours, one non-NK member said, ‘We have to keep
trust with our neighbours. If I die, they are the ones who will arrange my burial’.
According to another, ‘To live in this world, you have to rely on others. If there is
any danger, my neighbours will come forward. If I don’t trust them, who can I trust?’.
In other cases, it appeared to reflect an unwillingness to question authority too
closely. While non-NK members agreed on the injustice of landlords, the corruption
and venality of various public officials, particularly the police (‘Do the police have
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any religion?), they appeared to feel that they had no option but to trust them. As
one non-NK male put it:
I have to trust the matabbars: if I did not trust them, how could they run society?
But I do not trust them fully. Sometimes when they distribute justice, they 
pursue their own interests, sometimes their relatives’ interests. That is why
we question their verdicts. But we have no option but to trust him somewhat,
because we have to rely on them. 
Another said:
The court is the place of law, government law. We have to trust it. I trust the
MP somewhat. If I salute him, he does not respond. He lives in the city. We
hardly have a chance to meet him. 
The extremely high levels of trust expressed by NK members towards other NK
group members and towards NK staff testify to the strong bonds of solidarity that
NK has built among its groups. As one group member put it:
I trust our group members because we have imbibed the same ideas, we are
inspired by the same ideals. We have been together for a long time and I know
they will not harm me. 
Another said:
We trust all members of our Bhumiheen samity. When we have a crisis, they
are the ones we go to for help. We don’t go to the rich. Our neighbours don’t
help us, they behave like rich people. If I have no food, I ask them for rice,
they ask, how will you pay it back?’ 
Equally, the mistrust expressed by NK members towards other NGOs mirrored
the ideology of the organisation towards the NGO delivery of microfinance: 
Other NGOs are pioneers of discrimination. They give out loans but then they
have to force repayments. I don’t trust their members because they allow
these NGOs to come into our villages.
Other NGOs only give loans and take instalments, they are not interested in
human problems. Those who have taken loans no longer live here, they have
gone to the slums of Dhaka. 
We don’t trust other NGOs because the relationship with them is entirely
based on money. You can’t trust all other NGO group members: when they
need money, they come to their group members to persuade them to lend,
but after a few repayments, they stop repaying and the group becomes
responsible for their debt. 
Less easy to understand is the extension of this suspicion towards other NGO
group members, many of whom are drawn from the same economic strata as NK
members. It is worth recalling from the regression analysis that members of these
other NGOs, including those who also belonged to NK, were less likely to express
this lack of trust than NK only members. Clearly, NK’s strong stance against
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microfinance is most strongly adhered to by those who have had no experience of
these alternative organisations. 
Finally, women generally expressed lower levels of trust than men, regardless of
NGO affiliation. However, among women, patterns varied. Female NK members
were more likely than non-members to express trust towards people from other
religions (51 per cent expressed some degree of trust compared to just 37 per
cent of non-female members) and towards shalish conducted by NGOs or the
elected council. They were less trusting of elected officials and other NGOs. NK
membership clearly influences some of these attitudes. It also influences women’s
attitudes of trust towards their own families. While 99 per cent of men expressed
‘strong trust’ towards their own families, regardless of NGO affiliation, 92 per cent
of non-NK women expressed such trust but only 70 per cent of NK women. In
other words, women generally, and women from NK groups in particular, were
less trusting of their families than men. The focus group discussions suggested
that these lower levels of trust towards their families was largely aimed at husbands: 
I don’t trust my husband, he goes to the bazaar, he wanders around. His
character is not good ... He does not work. Trust has gone from the world.
There is nothing to be gained from trusting men. Sometimes they are fine,
sometimes not. Suppose he goes off and marries someone else when he is
already married? I have married off my sons and daughters. Now he listens to
his wife, how can I trust him ... he does not listen to me.
How can I trust everyone in my family? My husband is not one of my own
(apon na). I am a woman, he may remarry, how can I trust him? My trust will
depend on what he does, not all men are the same. That woman’s husband
abandoned her with two children to look after. 
When we take into account the patriarchal nature of the family, levels of domestic
violence against women and men’s increasing unreliability as breadwinners, it is
not surprising that women in general, but the more politically aware NK members
in particular, are reluctant to express absolute trust in ‘the family’. 
4 Conclusion: stories of  change and
the road not taken
The aim of this paper was to investigate the nature and extent of changes that NK
has succeeded in bringing about in the lives of its group members. On the basis
of this analysis, it also sought to analyse the extent to which NK’s strategies might
offer an alternative approach to the achievement of democracy and development
to that represented by the mainstream NGO sector in Bangladesh. It is evident
from our findings that NK has helped its members to make progress on both fronts.
It has contributed to democratic goals through a process of ‘growing citizenship
from grassroots’, aimed at democratising both ‘horizontal’ relationships among
poor women and men as well as the vertical relationship between the state and its
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less well off citizens. The survey found that NK members were more likely than
others in our study to know their constitutional rights, to vote, to campaign in local
and national elections and to interact with locally elected representatives and 
government officials. They were more likely to be elected to informal village 
committees, to be called to participate in shalishes held by local elites or the
upazilla chairman as well as to initiate their own shalish. They were more likely to
be approached by others within the community for their advice or opinion. They
were also more likely to have engaged in various forms of collective action on
behalf of themselves and others, protesting such matters as wrongful distribution
of government social transfers, land rights, violence against women, gender 
justice and collective wage bargaining. They were more critical of both traditional
power structures as well as corrupt local officials. 
NK has also clearly built a strong sense of solidarity among its membership. Its
members were more likely to consider their fellow group members as their most
important source of support in times of crisis, more important even than their 
families. They expressed extremely high levels of trust in their fellow group
members and NK staff. They were also more likely to subscribe to an egalitarian
vision of social justice than non-NK members and to believe that there had been
an improvement in the quality of justice in recent years. 
Furthermore, if the testimonies of NK group members are accepted, many of these
positive changes have spilt over beyond the boundaries of their groups into the
wider community. NK members believed that their activities have improved the
quality of justice within the community, strengthened the voices of the poor, reduced
the incidence of domestic and public violence against women, reduced the incidence
of dowry, increased women’s mobility in the public domain as well as having a
positive impact on children’s education. These suggest that that there has been a
shift in the balance of power at the local level. As one NK group in Sagatha told us:
There is no demand for the mattabar anymore, we take no notice of them.
Their time for ‘eating’ is over. We have made matabbars out of the landless. 
NK’s contribution to development goals included improvements in the quality of
diet, increase in productive asset base, access to electricity, diversification of
livelihoods, greater likelihood of child immunisation, increased female mobility in
the public domain and higher levels of female economic activity. Given that NK
does not provide any direct material resources to its members, apart from 
encouraging them to save on a regular basis, these changes in the economic 
conditions of its membership are likely to have been mediated by its training and
capacity building activities. Qualitative analysis carried out for this and earlier
studies suggest a number of possible routes through which these intangible
resources translate into tangible impacts: improved knowledge about diet and
health matters; greater awareness of rights and entitlements; increased capacity
to bargain with employers and landlords for fairer returns to their labour; the
capacity to engage in collective action against predatory landlords, to claim rights
or to ensure the just distribution of government provision for the poor; mutual 
support in times of crisis. Improvements in material conditions of members, 
particularly the strengthening of their economic base through savings and asset
formation, is in turn likely to have contributed to their greater willingness to take
the political risks associated with protesting injustice. 
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The survey findings thus provide strong evidence of changes in the lives of NK
group members. Given that both NK and non-NK members were drawn from the
same socioeconomic strata, the association between these changes and NK
membership was sufficiently systematic, and supported by previous qualitative
analysis, to attribute to NK’s efforts rather than to chance. The fact that a third of
NK members and non-members were also members of microfinance organisations
allows us to make a number of further generalisations. First of all, NK members
were more likely to report these achievements than non-NK members, regardless
of whether or not they belonged to a microfinance organisation. And secondly,
they were also systematically more likely to report these achievements than those
who only belonged to microfinance organisations. 
While we have to treat with caution any comparison of the impact of NK 
membership with membership of microfinance organisations in our study, given
that we do not know the duration of membership of these other organisations, the
weakness of governance impacts associated with the latter is supported by some
of the few studies that have explored this issue in relation to microfinance 
organisations within the South Asia region (Kabeer and Matin 2005; Kabeer
2005). Qualitative analysis into the views and experiences of poor people with
regard to development NGOs by Kabeer with Huq Kabir (2009) highlighted the far
greater trust they expressed towards NK and Samata6 compared to microfinance
organisations, their higher levels of political awareness and their greater 
engagement in collective action around their rights. Mahmud (2007) documents
the very active role played by NK members on Health Watch Committees set up
to monitor health service provision at the local level. Sultan found that the women
she interviewed in urban slum neighbourhoods in Bangladesh singled NK out as
the only NGO that they believed was committed to their interests (Sultan 1999). 
Other studies have also testified to the more democratic relationships that prevail
between NK staff and their group members (Thornton et al. 2000; Mahmud 2002)
compared to microfinance organisations. Microfinance service delivery in particular
is organised around a narrative of individual empowerment through market forces
and a relationship with its constituency that is largely driven by the imperatives of
loan disbursement and recovery. This leads to high levels of tension between
such organisations and their clients (Montgomery 1996). As Thornton et al. have
noted, there is a basic tension between NGO delivery of services and their 
capacity to demand greater accountability from the state when such demands
could just as easily be turned on their own service provision. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that social mobilisation organisations like
NK represent a citizen-centred approach to development goals that differs radically
from the service provision approach that dominates the NGO sector in Bangladesh
today. The pace of change in household asset formation and livelihood strategies
may be more gradual than that associated with the service delivery model, but it is
achieved through the efforts of its membership to save, to learn and to act for
themselves on a number of important fronts. Moreover, their efforts have had
6 Another organisation also focused on social mobilisation. 
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important political externalities for the wider economy, including changes in the
power relations which keep the poor at the mercy of traditional power holders and
dependent on the discretion of public officials for their basic entitlements. Such
achievements would appear to provide a socially sustainable foundation for the
achievement of development goals.
There is therefore clearly a role within the Bangladesh NGO community for 
organisations like Nijera Kori whose relationships with their constituencies are
organised around everyday practices of citizenship rather than around the 
provision of services. Yet the future of these organisations is uncertain as 
previous solidarity funding from international NGOs and progressive foundations
dries up without a discernible expansion in new sources. 
The poverty of their membership makes it impossible for such organisations to
survive by charging membership fees. It is highly unlikely that corrupt and rent-
seeking governments that have been in power in Bangladesh for much of its 
history will be willing to provide financial support to organisations that are seeking
to make them more transparent, democratic and responsive to their citizens.
While there is a great deal of private philanthropy in Bangladesh, much of it is 
religious in nature and goes towards the support of mosques and religious
schools. While there has been an increase in overseas aid from the Middle East
over the years, it is devoted to the promotion of Islamic values and welfare 
organisations rather than secular ones. 
And while Western overseas aid to the NGO sector has also risen over the past
decade, it is based on a narrative of civil society and social change that is heavily
skewed towards financially sustainable service provision. As we have noted, this
has ensured that the NGO sector has evolved along a very narrow trajectory.
Concerns with transaction costs have led to a concentration of donor funds on a
few large NGOs. The bias towards financially sustainable organisations has led to
a growing homogenisation of the NGO sector as social mobilisation and social
development activities give way to an almost exclusive focus on microfinance 
provision. 
Homogenisation has been further enforced by the technical auditing procedures
through which donors hold organisations accountable. The use of a logical 
framework with its linear narrative of objectively verifiable and predictable social
change within the timespan of the project cycle has served to ‘projectise’ NGO
activities and to restrict them to the delivery of tangible outputs that can be directly
linked to the MDGs. Organisations like Nijera Kori do not easily fit into this project
cycle universe. The impacts reported in this paper are the culmination of 10–15
years of mobilising work, many are too intangible to be easily measured while 
others cannot be easily accommodated within the MDG framework. When the
costs of achieving equivalent reductions in poverty through organisations like NK
are compared with the costs associated with service-oriented organisations, it is
likely that the latter look more cost-effective. However, this calculus is likely to be
radically altered if the democratic dividends associated with NK’s approach to
poverty reduction are factored into the equation. 
The NGO sector in Bangladesh has rightly been credited with an important role in
the country’s progress on the social development front but it has generally failed
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to impact on the deeper structures of inequality in the country or to halt the steady
deterioration of the quality of governance. The advocacy activities of some of the
rural-based NGOs may increase people’s awareness of their rights, but there is 
little effort to translate this awareness into forms of political engagement that
would provide a grassroots impetus for good governance. The organisations that
could provide this impetus have been reduced to a small minority in the country.
They represent the road not taken. 
Consequently, improvements in individual lives brought about by service-oriented
NGOs are constantly undermined by various forms of unruly practice on the part
of more powerful sections of society. 
What we have in Bangladesh therefore is the paradox of a country that has made
considerable progress on poverty reduction, human development and gender
equality but that also occupies the unenviable status of being one of the world’s
most corrupt countries. It represents a canonical case study of the limitations to
what can be achieved through the introduction of free market principles and multi-
party democracy when the structural roots of inequality remain unaddressed. 
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